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Introduction 
 
The beginning of the 21st century is marked on the timeline of contemporary 
international relations as time of new threats and challenges. One of these challenges is 
the process of ensuring and maintaining the energy security of a state. 
Energy security as an academic notion and a political tool has been drawing a 
close attention of the states, international corporations, media and other actors from 
within the sphere of world politics and international relations. 
It is to be noted that energy security does not exist on its own, it is always 
considered as a part of a continuous process of states’ interaction, cooperation and 
competition. Yet, since the role of the energy resources, mechanisms of their acquisition 
and preservation remains critical in the contemporary world politics, energy security as 
a process and an aim without any doubts has its independent and substantive niche 
within states’ policies formation strategies and academic research domain. 
Energy security concept in its modern sense was developed because of 
international reaction to the energy crisis of 1973-1974. Before that, the energy security 
predominantly implied a timely provision of the national armed forced with fuel and 
energy resources. 
The crisis that resulted in new understanding of energy security was caused by 
the fourth Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. The armed conflict was named “Judgment 
Day War”, it lasted only 18 days, but led to a world-wide oil shock, which hit the 
markets all over the globe and became the first world energy crisis, and it is deemed the 
most drastic to present day. Among its repercussions are usually pointed out the 
increase of Israeli reliance on the United States and unraveling the real extent of 
developed states’ dependence on the oil as energy resource and the world oil market as 
its medium.  
For the purposes of prediction, prevention and counteraction to such crises the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) was established in 1974. Among other tasks, IEA 
dedicated its efforts to the “developing and implementation of the effective mechanisms 
for managing energy policies on the world scale”. 
Primarily the world energy policy management implies ensuring uninterrupted 
supplies of energy resources between the major market players and, when possible, 
bolstering regional and national energy independence. IEA admits – the main field of 
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interest for the organization was and remains the establishing of oil energy security, yet 
IEA recognizes the all-encompassing nature of energy security and with the utmost 
attention follows all the developments in the fields of gas, coal, renewables and other 
resources related to the national and world energy security.1  
One of the most notable events in this regard was the swift and fundamental 
improvement that the US energy industry underwent in the few past decades. The final 
stage of this process was called “Shale revolution” and it became the result of a range of 
factors. First of all, rigorous preparations that started already in the past century; 
secondly, multiple practical experiments that required development of new technologies 
and their implementation; and thirdly, conscious political will fostered by meticulous 
strategic planning put into action as a response to the very aforementioned oil crisis of 
1970s. 
Shale revolution not only allowed the US to extract previously inaccessible 
energy resources such as light tight oil and shale gas, consequently improving energy 
independence through substituting imports by national production. It also reinforced the 
US Administration’s bargaining positions on the world scale, especially with the Middle 
Eastern counterparts; on the regional scale by enabling natural gas into the neighbor-
states trade routes; and on the local scale by making cheaper fuel possible across the 
United States. 
Yet all these advantages had negative repercussion due to the technical 
peculiarities of shale resources extraction, namely – multistage hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal directional drilling. These procedures both harm the environment by tearing 
the landscape and poisoning the local waters and soils, and cause certain economic 
controversies. Not only they require immense amounts of sweet water; but also the 
territories subjected to shale extractions became uninhabitable and unsuitable for almost 
any type of economic activity. 
As far as the energy security is concerned, from the operational and strategic 
standpoints shale revolution is one of the most valuable assets and achievements of the 
American energy industry. It is a mean to meeting both short-term and long-term goals. 
In the first case, it is an interrupted supply of the national economy with the energy 
resources on a daily basis, developing transport routs and modernizing energy 
                                                          
1 IEA, 2012 Annual report (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2013) 
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infrastructure. From the strategic prospective, it is energy resources and supply routes 
diversification, ensuring energy independence of the country along with the augmenting 
international political advantage, and securing long-term energy investment plans. 
Nevertheless, there is another, rather new dimension of energy security – a 
sustainability context. It was not a part of the original energy security theory, because 
until the very recent times sustainable development deemed as a vague concept. 
Corporate and national interests overshadowed responsibility for the future generations, 
while costs of the sustainability mechanisms and methods were too high and the 
benefits of sustainable approach were hardly palpable.  
By the beginning of 2000s, the notion of sustainable development was promoted 
enough to penetrate social consciousness to a degree that would allow the society in 
democratic countries to form a distinctive request. That was a demand for corporate and 
governmental policy makers to implement sustainability elements into the development 
strategies, while these elements became more economically feasible and proved their 
importance.  
Sustainable development in the theory of energy security is a new approach, 
which is only yet to be employed by the major players on the energy markets. However, 
it is already clear that once properly implemented it will inevitable affect the modern 
states’ systems of energy security maintenance, not excluding its shale component in the 
United States. The shale energy resources industry is already under a considerable 
pressure from the environmental organizations and activists for the reasons mentioned 
above. Nevertheless, the sustainability concept goes beyond the traditional theory of 
environmental protection; apart from such notions as “good” and “harmful” it also 
operates with the ideas of economic feasibility, complex societal repercussions, public 
policy strategies, investment planning and others. In this perspective it is yet unclear if 
shale revolution and its effects deemed as an unquestionable advantage by the 
traditional theory of energy security remains so once the sustainability component takes 
its place. 
 
Research’s topicality 
The research can be a valid contribution to the relevant current scientific 
discourse for a variety of reasons. First, official academic publications statistics shows 
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that the term “Energy security” was used in scientific articles 41 times between the 
years 1994 and 1999, while for the period of 2000-2005 it was used already in 1150 
academic works. This fact signifies the growing interest of the world academic 
community for this topic.2  
Secondly, there are evidences that the ‘sustainability’ component of the energy 
security theory is underdeveloped and only yet to be fully disclosed and implemented 
into the discourse in the entirety of its power. In year 2014 among the scientific articles 
dedicated to the problems of energy security only 26% of them were focused on so 
called ‘stewardship dimension’, which implies environmental and socio-economic 
concerns as much as solicitude for future generations.3 Given the importance of these 
three latter elements, one might argue that sustainability within energy security theory 
requires further elaboration.  
Thirdly, the methods of extraction of previously inaccessible resources pose a 
threat for the environment and local communities. This threat is not only palpable and 
serious, but can possibly make the current energy security theory completeness and 
shale revolution advantages at least argumentative.4 Sustainable development, 
environmental issues and ensuring national energy security of such a prominent global 
actor as the US indeed have a strong mutual bound and a complex system of 
interrelating and interacting elements. In addition, in the given fused form, they 
highlight one of the most threatening development trend – energy industry is 
responsible for 68% of the global greenhouse emissions by the year 2016.5 Negligence 
towards the sustainable energy security global will inevitably lead to the world’s 
temperature rise at exponential rate. Crisis in water supply (resources extraction, energy 
production and transportation require immense amounts of fresh water), food (biomass-
to-fuel conversion causes interruptions in foodstuffs supply and the price increase) and 
degradation of the entire biosphere; The fact that the “Living Planet Index” has dropped 
                                                          
2 Leung, Guy C. K., ‘China’s Energy Security: Perception and Reality’, Energy Policy, 39 (2011), 1330–
37 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.005> 
3 Brown, Marilyn A., Yu Wang, Benjamin K. Sovacool, and Anthony Louis D’Agostino, ‘Forty Years of 
Energy Security Trends: A Comparative Assessment of 22 Industrialized Countries’, Energy Research & 
Social Science, 4 (2014), 64–77 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.08.008> 
4 Shrestha, Namita, Govinda Chilkoor, Joseph Wilder, Venkataramana Gadhamshetty, and James J. 
Stone, ‘Potential Water Resource Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing from Unconventional Oil Production in 
the Bakken Shale’, Water Research, 108 (2017), 1–24 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.watres.2016.11.006> 
5 International Energy Agency, Key CO2 Emissions Trends (IEA, 2016) 
<http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyCO2EmissionsTrends.pdf> 
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by 30% since 1970, while the “Ecological Footprint” grew in 2.4 times is the most vocal 
illustration.6 
 
Research question 
The primary question of the research is posed as follows – is the Shale 
revolution in the US still viable after introducing the sustainability dimension of energy 
security? 
Main research objective is to scrutinize the viability of extraction of previously 
inaccessible resources in the US through the perspective of the sustainability dimension 
of the energy security theory. Specific objectives comprise: 
Objective 1: To examine the existing energy security discourse and the extent of 
sustainability dimension implementation 
Objective 2: To assess the shale industry potential for endangering the 
environment on the local and global scales 
Objective 3: To investigate the possible repercussions of the shale revolution for 
the US socio-economic dimension, future generations and sustainable development of 
the energy industry. 
 
Research design, methodology and hypothesis  
The research is designed as a single-case study (USA).  
The research’s hypothesis rests on the suggestion that once the sustainability 
dimension is implemented into the US national energy security strategy (NESE), current 
technics of extraction of previously inaccessible resources become inexpedient and 
unfeasible from the point of view of energy sustainability economics. The hypothesis 
sounds then as follows: once the energy sustainability dimension is implemented into 
the NESE, the shale revolution in its current state is no longer viable. 
In this regard, there were two most essential tasks. Firstly, to track the 
operational concepts down to their origins, considering their evolutional process and 
binding them together in the form suitable for the research. Secondly, to assess the 
premises and impacts of the shale revolution, its viability in the context of stewardship 
                                                          
6 Lior, Noam, ‘Sustainable Energy Development (May 2011) with Some Game-Changers’, Energy, 40 
(2012), 3–18 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2011.09.044> 
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dimension implementation and the current status as much as future prospects of the US 
sustainable energy development. 
Analysis of the relevant methods for assessing a state’s energy security 
efficiency and the sustainability paradigm showed that the optimal methodological 
trajectory based on the objectives previously mentioned would be the combinations of 
descriptive researches, supply-oriented approach, literature review and energy security 
indices weighting.  
Assessing energy security in the context of sustainability dimension is twice 
more difficult as a task than evaluating these concepts separately, because neither the 
former nor the letter is decisively outlined, framed or defined. In these circumstances, 
the chosen methods allow tackling the most challenging qualities of the given concepts.  
It was noted that supply-oriented method yields reliable outcomes for assessing 
the state’s current energy security trends and momentary developments on a rather 
moderate and limited time interval. This became particularly useful for evaluating the 
present state of the US’ energy sector, latest security concerns and the repercussions of 
the Shale revolution, which keep unfolding. 
At the same time, generally supply-oriented method is ineffective for grasping 
the complex long-term developments of the environmental dimension and more 
specifically – sustainability stewardship. An in-depth literature review, content analysis 
of the official documents and weighting of the composite indices allowed taking a 
closer look at events and phenomena extended in time. Among these were the multi-
pronged process of sustainability discourse formation, variety of sustainability criteria 
and schools of thoughts emergence, modern mechanisms of sustainable stewardship 
implementation and trajectories of sustainable energy security development. For the 
evaluation of correlation coefficient between such trends as changes in the oil prices and 
the pace of the shale industry development – a statistical regression analysis was 
employed.  
 
Theoretical framework 
Energy security issues are often a subject to the closest attention of the world-
renowned researchers and scientists. The most essential contributions within the given 
field and focus were made by the following specialists.  
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Daniel Yergin7 – many of his researches put together have become a 
fundamental cornerstone for multiple contemporary theories related to energy security. 
He was one of the first to formulate the definition of energy security as such and 
identify its essential problems and questions. Under his supervision in 2006, the “New 
Energy Security Paradigm” was adopted by the World Economic Forum and designed 
the public perception of the topic for the past decade.8 
Benjamin Sovacool9 investigated the progressive dimension of energy security, 
relevant innovation and modern technologies, as much as the importance of the 
alternative energy sources in ensuring security. He is famous for combining qualitative 
and quantitative approaches in assessing energy security. He claimed that the 
combination of methods would allow researchers to unravel previously undetectable 
connections between the events happening within a country and abroad and their 
impacts for the system of energy security. 
Andreas Goldthau10 assessed the prospects of natural gas as a tool of ensuring 
energy security, considered the possibility and controversies of creating an organization 
of natural gas exporting countries (analogue to OPEC - Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries), elaborated on Asian and Russian approaches to the issue and 
significantly contributed to the establishing the energy security system of the European 
Union. 
The contribution to investigating and formation the energy security theory of the 
following researches should also be noted:  
                                                          
7 Yergin, Daniel, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, Reissue edition (New York: Free 
Press, 2008) 
Yergin, Daniel, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World, Upd Rev Re 
edition (New York: Penguin Books, 2012) 
Yergin, Daniel, ‘Energy Security in the 1990s’, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1988 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/43658/daniel-yergin/energy-security-in-the-1990s> [accessed 7 
March 2017] 
Yergin, Daniel, and Daniel Yergin, ‘Ensuring Energy Security’, Foreign Affairs, 1 March 2006 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-03-01/ensuring-energy-security> [accessed 8 March 2017] 
8 The New Energy Security Paradigm - World Economic Forum 2006 in partnership with Cambridge 
Energy Research Associates. Workpaper. <https://members.weforum.org/pdf/ENERGY.PDF> (accessed 
8 March 2017) 
9 Sovacool, Benjamin K., ed., The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security, 1 edition (London ; New 
York: Routledge, 2011) 
Sovacool, Benjamin K., ‘Evaluating Energy Security in the Asia Pacific: Towards a More Comprehensive 
Approach’, Energy Policy, 39 (2011), 7472–79 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.10.008 
10 Goldthau, Andreas, and Benjamin K. Sovacool, ‘The Uniqueness of the Energy Security, Justice, and 
Governance Problem’, Energy Policy, 41 (2012), 232–40 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.10.042 
Goldthau, Andreas, ‘Governing Global Energy: Existing Approaches and Discourses’, Current Opinion in 
Environmental Sustainability, 3 (2011), 213–17 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2011.06.003> 
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Cohen G., Joutz F., Loungani P11; Keppler J.H.12; Sheepers M., Seebregts. A., de 
Jong J., Maters H.13; Frondel M., Schmidt C.M.14; Paterson W.15; Hughes L.16; Jansen 
J.17 and others. 
The source base of the research comprises researches, reviews and reports of 
various international institutions and organizations. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA), which publishes on a regular basis statistical and analytical outlooks on the state 
and indexes of world’s and countries’ energy security18. Also Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United National Secretariat (DESA)19, World Economic 
Forum (WEF).20 
There are a number of energy related concepts constituting the backbone of the 
conceptual framework. First, it is the multivariance and mutability of the very notion of 
energy security, which is a so-called ‘umbrella term’. It comprises a range of 
approaches, priorities and criteria of assessment, which vary both from one actor to 
another and within one actor’s strategy throughout the time. It is essential for 
understanding and evaluating a state’s energy security mechanisms at every given 
moment and for dissection of the evolution of energy strategy. Secondly, it is the 
concept of affordability of energy resources, which reveals very specific yet not always 
self-evident market laws, according to which energy commodities are being traded. This 
notion is vital for drawing a line between strategic and operational segments of energy 
security, which in turn is another important concept – two-dimensionality of energy 
                                                          
11 Cohen, Gail, Frederick Joutz, and Prakash Loungani, ‘Measuring Energy Security: Trends in the 
Diversification of Oil and Natural Gas Supplies’, Energy Policy, 39 (2011), 4860–69 
12 Keppler, Jan Horst, ‘International Relations and Security of Energy Supply: Risks to Continuity and 
Geopolitical Risks’, 2007 <http://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/200> [accessed 8 March 2017] 
13 Scheepers, Martin, Ad Seebregts, Jacques de Jong, and Hans Maters, ‘EU Standards for Energy 
Security of Supply’, Gas, 52 (2007), 67–5 
14 Frondel, Manuel., and Christoph M. Schmidt, Measuring Energy Security a Conceptual Note (Essen: 
RWI, 2008) <http://d-nb.info/989632598/34> [accessed 10 March 2017] 
15 Patterson, Walt, ‘Managing Energy Wrong’, University of Sussex, 2008 
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20
Development/0608patterson.pdf> [accessed 10 March 2017] 
16 Hughes, Larry, ‘The Four ‘R’s of Energy Security’, Energy Policy, 37 (2009), 2459–61 
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.02.038> 
17 Jansen, J. C., Energy Services Security: Concepts and Metrics (ECN, 2009) 
<ftp://ftp.ecn.nl/pub/www/library/report/2009/e09080.pdf> [accessed 10 March 2017] 
18 International Energy Agency, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World 
Energy Outlook 2011. (Paris: IEA, International Energy Agency : OECD, 2011) 
19 Economic, United Nations Department of, and United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development, Industrial Development for the 21st Century: Sustainable Development Perspectives 
(United Nations Publications, 2007) 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/full_report.pdf> [accessed 8 March 2017] 
20  
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security. Employing the latter allows attributing a certain pool of political and 
managerial tools to an actor after defining one’s dimensional positioning.  
The part of the research concerning the sustainability issues is resting on a 
respective set of cornerstone concepts. Firstly, it is the concept of sustainable 
development itself, its genesis and its conceptual power concealed in the vagueness and 
terminological liquidity of the notion. It bolsters the descriptive and discussion elements 
of the research, allows flexible deriving multiple conclusions and building various 
scenarios. Besides, the concept of environmental security, tightly intertwined with 
sustainable development is to be examined, for energy industries have the most 
profound effect on the global environment, while the repercussions of negligence and 
connivance in the given sphere might cause irreversible damage to the life sustaining 
properties of habitats. In this regard, the concepts of corporate sustainability and 
greenwashing are of utmost importance as well. Not least because it is the transnational 
energy corporations, who tend to defy the principles of environmental protection and 
sustainable development mimicking an eco-friendly production process, while being 
responsible for enormous amounts of harm inflicted upon eco-systems. Developing of 
these concepts will allow defining energy companies’ role in the US national strategy of 
energy security, as much as their potential for bolstering sustainable energy 
development. 
 
 
Structure 
The structure of the research reflects the objectives set and corresponds to the 
aim of the study. It is divided into three parts: 
Chapter 1 - contains the overview and the assessment of the existing energy 
security discourse. The most essential theories and concepts are presented and analyzed. 
The evolution of the approaches towards energy security ensuring is tracked on the 
timeline of the past half a century. The premises for the emergence of the sustainability 
dimension of energy security as much as the concept development are discussed. 
Chapter 2 – contains the analysis of the US energy security approach. Political, 
economic and environmental issues related to extraction of previously inaccessible 
resources. Prerequisites and repercussions of the Shale revolution are scrutinized, as 
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much as the peculiarities of its execution and public discourse around it. Shale 
revolution’s role within the conventional theory of energy security is considered. 
Chapter 3 – contains the assessment of the sustainability component’s 
implementation stage into the energy security maintenance system of the US – official 
and factual. Compatibility of the stewardship dimension with the traditional means of 
energy resources production is reviewed, as much as with the various means of 
extraction of previously inaccessible resources. Assessment of Shale revolution results 
and prospect from the standpoint of sustainable development of energy security is 
presented.  
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Chapter 1 – Theoretical background on sustainable development and energy 
security 
1.1 The versatility of the energy security concept 
 
Since the time of the global energy crisis of 1973-1974 the concept of energy 
security has changed dramatically in response to the new challenges, it has acquired 
numerous details; differentiated approaches were formed for various subjects such as of 
exporters, brokers, net importers etc. It also now touches upon multiple aspects related 
to the political dimension of the issue. The modern versatility of the concept is the very 
reason for the variety of definitions. 
It is necessary to draw the line between strategic and operational energy security. 
The former is the field for long-term investments in energy supply, which correspond to 
the general direction of economic development and environmental requirements. 
Operational energy security is rooted in the military origins of the very concept and 
focuses on the ability of the energy system to respond to sudden changes in the balance 
of energy supply adequately and rapidly.21 
The International Energy Agency defines energy security as “Uninterrupted 
availability of energy sources at an affordable price”.22 It is worth looking into this 
definition because its first part allows us to draw a distinctive line and illustrate the 
difference between the operational and strategic dimensions of energy security. An 
uninterrupted availability of energy resources in operational terms means the physical 
supply of resources allowing the given system to accomplish its regular and timely 
energy intake, hence ensuring the mere functioning of the economic and social 
institutions. The main threats in this regards are being posed by the logistic obstacles, 
malfunction of the energy infrastructure, local warfare and terrorist attacks, blockade of 
the supply routes due to the international pressure and sanctions, and other force-
majeure circumstances that make the energy commodities prices in a certain region 
skyrocket and force the local governments to unseal the reserves. 
                                                          
21 ‘Operational Energy Strategy’ (Department of Defense of the United States, 2010) 
<http://www.secnav.navy.mil/eie/ASN%20EIE%20Policy/DODOperationalEnergyStrategy.pdf> 
[accessed 9 March 2017] 
22 ‘Energy Security’, International Energy Agency <https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/> 
[accessed 10 March 2017] 
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Strategic understanding of an uninterrupted availability of energy resources 
implies a different approach. It predetermines the states’ continuous endeavors to think 
long-term, forming a versatile pool of reliable energy suppliers and intermediary trade 
partners, capable of changing each other in various market and political circumstances. 
Long-term (10 and more years) contracts for energy commodities supply are one of the 
cornerstones of strategic energy security. The energy supplies themselves are being 
diversified by the type of commodity in order to evenly distribute the reliance of a 
country on different kinds of resources and prevent the situation of morbid dependence 
on a single type of energy carrier. Backup energy infrastructure and the storage 
capacities are being designed, commodities are being hoarded and reserve stocks are 
being created. Another essential component of the strategic dimension - often overseen 
by export-oriented resource abundant countries - is the telic governmental investment 
policy: energy infrastructure modernization; sponsorship for energy research and 
development within academia, scientific community and corporate departments; all-
encompassing support for minor energy enterprises. 
Turning to the second half of the IEA’s definition and inquiring its relation to 
the operational and strategic segments, one should also be able to differentiate the 
contexts of the price’s affordability. On the one hand, affordable price implies that a 
state can purchase a particular type of resource without undermining its own economy, 
budgetary balance, social stability and national interests. On the other hand, price can be 
affordable when it is adequate to the current market situation and corresponds to the 
market’s expectations. For instance, if the price of barrel of oil acutely rises because of 
an armed conflict in the oil-producing region, this price will be affordable for the entire 
world market as long as the trade keeps functioning even with the new ground rule. Yet 
for some net-importing states the price ceases being affordable. Thus, it can be inferred 
that an affordable price in terms of energy security in the state context naturally 
gravitates to the strategic dimension, since it contains a requirement for low-volatile 
prices of supplied energy resources. In other words, an affordable price within the 
energy security domain might not necessarily mean the cheapest offer on the market, 
but the one least subjected to the conditional fluctuations.  
In addition, this makes the notion of energy affordability a variable changing 
from one country to another, depending on state’s individual economic capacities. Bert 
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Kruyt et al. dissected the framework of security of supply – which is traditionally the 
subject to energy related risks – into four elements: 
 Availability – or elements relating to geological existence. 
 Accessibility – or geopolitical elements. 
 Affordability – or economical elements. 
 Acceptability – or environmental and societal elements. 
Thus, the affordability notion is essential for examining the economic dimension 
of sustainable energy development. For this purpose, Kruyt et al. distinguish a set of 
indicators most suitable for assessing the affordability of an energy commodity for a 
given country at a given moment. They comprise both simple indicators such as oil/gas 
price or market liquidity and aggregated indices such as IEA’s energy security index 
dealing with the suppliers’ concentration in the market or Bollen’s ‘Willingness to pay’ 
index.23 
Nevertheless, the IEA’s definition determines a rather broad and unspecified 
framework, while the contemporary energy security wields a more complicated nature, 
the emphasis in which shifts depending on the subject, external and internal factors. 
This emphasis can take a form of an approach employed by the energy security subject. 
Three major directions that can be pointed out are the diversification-oriented, export-
oriented and market-oriented approaches.  
 • The diversification-oriented approach is typical for the states that do not wield 
any significant amount of natural resources or face a certain kind of a barrier for their 
production – legislative, ecological, technical etc. Linda Yueh states that this approach, 
when being detached from the comprehensive and coherent development of the energy 
security system, poses a risk of growing into a mere process of ensuring energy 
independence. The latter alone cannot meet the need of a state for a full-fledged energy 
security.24 It is important to differentiate energy security from energy independence; 
they are not identical and correlate as a sum and a term respectively within the 
diversification-oriented approach.  
                                                          
23 Kruyt, Bert, D. P. van Vuuren, H. J. M. de Vries, and H. Groenenberg, ‘Indicators for Energy Security’, 
Energy Policy, China Energy Efficiency, 37 (2009), 2166–81 
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.02.006> 
24 Yueh, Linda, ‘An International Approach to Energy Security’, Global Policy, 1 (2010), 216–17 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00004.x> 
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• Export-oriented approach is a specific feature of countries, whose budgetary 
balance and economic well-being heavily relies on the export of energy-resources. It 
might not necessarily be the resource-abundant countries, but also the states that play 
the role of an intermediary trade partner. The most vocal example for this is the 
Republic of Belarus, whose international trade almost for 50% consists of re-export of 
discounted Russian energy resources to the European Union.25 The utmost priority of 
the states employing this approach is to secure as many long-term supply contracts as it 
is permissible by the production capacity and - in case a state possesses certain means of 
international political influence – to maintain the natural resources’ prices at the highest 
level possible. Due to natural reasons of political formation and economic development, 
such countries in many cases are the ones with ineffective and hulking bureaucratic 
vertical of power; moreover, they have a considerable chance of being infected with so-
called ‘Dutch disease’. The term stands for a situation when a state’s extensive export of 
natural resources obstructs the development in domestic manufacturing and innovative 
processes. Yet Mironov and Petronevich point out that the very term is self-
contradictory – a significant monetary influx to a country cannot be deemed as a 
‘disease’ a-priory. For this reason, economists deem it as a structural problem referring 
to an imbalance in sectorial resources allocation. It leads to an unhealthy extensive 
economic growth, compromised ability of the economic system to resist shocks and 
makes national production uncompetitive through the currency value increase.26  
• The market-oriented approach can be employed by the countries with 
significant historical reliance on trade and those who possess the features, capacities and 
status of an international trade hub. This approach postulates that energy resources 
should be deemed as mere commodities, subjects to the market laws and trends; hence, 
due to the liberalization and globalization of the energy markets, the energy security 
should be nothing else but the product of interactions among the market players in the 
mutable market circumstances.27 
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The Head of Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) – Daniel Yergin 
provides various definitions and formulas of energy security that can be applied to 
different actors employing diverse approaches. He claims that energy corporations’ 
primary focus is the access to new sites of resources, the ability to develop their own 
infrastructure and dwelling in the favorable investment environment. For advanced 
political entities, the main priorities are uninterrupted supplies of energy resources, 
security of the energy infrastructure and its ability to withstand the terrorist, military 
and environmental threats. The most characteristic concerns of the developing counties 
are desire to support the extensive growth of the economy with the abundance of 
resources and apprehension of malfunction in the system of internal and external 
economic relations in this context.28 
Also in 1988 Daniel Yergin came up with a comprehensive definition of energy 
security that was cites numerous times since then. He argues that: ‘Objective of energy 
security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in 
ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives”.29 This definition 
distinguishes itself from the one provided by the IEA through prioritization of the 
national interests and goals over short-term economic advantages. Since the national 
security and strategy are long-term concepts, this definition can be deemed as more 
comprehensive, encompassing and corresponding to the strategic dimension of energy 
security. 
Although the discussion around the definitions of energy security is still 
ongoing, the majority of the specialists in the respective field managed to find a 
compromise in defining the most essential components of energy security strategy: 
 Diversification of energy supplies – as the major component of energy 
security. 
 The existence and functioning of the single unified and publicly accepted oil 
market. 
 Maintenance of safety margin at a reasonable level - namely the amount of 
spare productions capacities, emergency reserves and surplus of production. 
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 Reliance on flexible markets and preventing external actors from grasping a 
control over them at the micro level.  
 Awareness of the existing interdependence at all levels between the energy 
companies and states as much as the acceptance of the importance of all-
encompassing cooperation. 
 Creating and maintaining relationships between suppliers and consumers in 
context of loyalty and trust. 
 An active system of ensuring the physical integrity and security of the 
energy infrastructure 
 The informational transparency in the operational segment – namely, 
provision of relevant information on the matter before, during and after the 
occurrence of problematic situations. 
 Funding the relevant researches and implementation of high-tech 
developments in the field of energy security.30 
Summing up, it is evident that the notion of energy security is an evolving 
methodological construct. Originating in the surge of energy-related concerns after the 
oil shocks of 1970, it has a solid conceptual core acknowledged by the specialists – an 
uninterrupted access to energy sources. All the later developments and add-ons allow 
calibrating the precise coverage and aim of the concept, adjusting it to the specific 
scientific or political goals at hand. Energy security is an umbrella term, taking into 
consideration various fringes of the research object. The given list of energy security 
system components includes almost all essential parts, yet what it fails to mention and 
what the definition of Daniel Yergin touches upon rather indirectly – is the issue of 
sustainable dimension of energy security. 
1.2 Sustainable development framework 
Sustainable development (SD) as a concept was born out of international 
community’s concerns for the environmental protection, promotion of renewable 
resources and discussion about eco-development on the verge of 70s-80s in the 20th 
century.31 The term ‘sustainable development’ was popularized by the International 
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Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) when the World 
Conservation Strategy (WCS) was published in 1980. Among the principles stipulated 
there, the following ones were of the utmost importance for the discourse:  
 United global context for the problems of development and conservation as 
much as for their solutions; 
 Significant role of poverty and basic vital resources inaccessibility as driving 
forces for habitats destruction and environmental impairment; 
 Necessity of a new economic approach aimed at reducing the gap between 
the developed and developing countries as much as at mitigating the 
vulnerabilities of the particular national economies; 
 Importance of adjusting the existing international financial and monetary 
systems in accordance with the requirements of sustainable development.32  
In the 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
published their famous report “Our Common Future” (also known as Brundland report). 
Apart from a broad discussion on the nature of the newly trended topic of sustainable 
development, it introduced the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The report 
presented NGOs to the world of sustainability politics and acknowledged their status as 
full-fledged players on this field. Also WCED presented a groundwork-definition for 
SD. In the report, the following was stated: «Sustainable development is development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”.33 Despite the fact that the definition was created 
in 1987, it is still quite widespread nowadays. By 2017 and has been citied and referred 
to so many times that it might now be perceived as an axiomatic truism. Nevertheless, 
both the concept itself and the definition had always been deemed by the academic 
community rather argumentative and twofold – not least because of their vagueness.  
On the one hand, these blurred frames of the concept and the very absence of a 
univocal interpretation of the term bore a significant conciliating potential. As it is 
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argued by R.Repetto – sustainable development rests on three pillars: scientific realities, 
consensus on ethical principles and considerations of long-term interests. He claims that 
unacceptability of jeopardizing the wellbeing of future generations, general recognition 
of poverty-countering actions priority and awareness of environmental endangerment’s 
potential to imperil every and each one’s self-interests – is a solid and reliable common 
ground for further discourse and development.34 One of the most prominent researchers 
of sustainable development, S. Lélé, also mentioned that the SD concept and WCS were 
quite positively received by the scholarly community’s critics as a new basic goal of 
society because it simultaneously incorporated the interests of two major movements – 
proponents of development and environmental community. He calls sustainable 
development “a metafix that will unite everybody from the profit-minded industrialist 
and risk minimizing subsistence farmer to the equity seeking social worker, the 
pollution-concerned or wildlife-loving First Worlder, the growth-maximizing policy 
maker, the goal-oriented bureaucrat, and therefore, the vote-counting politician”. .35 On 
the other hand, Lélé himself admits: “SD is in real danger of becoming a cliché like 
appropriate technology – a fashionable phrase that everyone pays homage to but nobody 
cares to define”.  
Yet even having itself thoroughly defined, the concept remains a subject to a 
reasonable amount of criticism. According to Michael Redclift there are two main 
exposures in the notion and definition of sustainable development – intra-generational 
and inter-generational. As far as the first one is concerned, Redclift argues that even if 
we assume that economic development may not be inversely proportional to the 
environmental security, it is inevitable that a given group of people will exclude other 
groups from meeting their goals and while enlarging own choices. Even bolstering local 
sustainability at a given region, this will reduce the number sustainability choices for 
the others.36 Any European or American trans-national corporation outsourcing the 
high-waste production to the developing regions can be an illustration to this point. P. 
Marcuse supports this claim. He asserts - “Sustainability and social justice do not 
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necessarily go hand in hand”.37 Moreover, such outsourcing strategy of the western 
corporations might be one of few ways for the local middle and upper class 
communities to secure steady incomes, so they keep abusing their natural and human 
capitals.38 Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that one of the primary goals of SD 
formulated in WCS is to create global context for the problems of development. Hence, 
this exposure can be rather attributed to the malfunction of implementation of these 
principles, and not entirely to the concept itself. As for the inter-generational 
vulnerability of SD, Redclift, referring to the Brundtland definition, states the 
following: “Needs themselves change, so it is unlikely […] that those of future 
generations will be the same as those of the present generations”.  
As it is rather problematic to dispute such assumptive projections and univocally 
confirm or disprove them, there are two full-fledged schools of thought in SD, which 
grew out this dichotomy, exercising so called ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ sustainability.39 The 
weak sustainability proponents argue that all the repercussions of the humanity’s actions 
and the harm inflicted onto the environment are either redeemable or interchangeable 
with artificial substitutions. This standpoint is usually intrinsic to the corporate-
affiliated researchers or the admirers and of radical technologization, which tend to 
prioritize technological development and idealize the benign scientific potential of 
modern science. Yet this position has also competent and reliable supporters who 
bolster it with economic researches. Robert Solow who claimed, “The world can, in 
effect, get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a 
catastrophe”, pronounced the most vocal manifestation of this approach.40 Strong 
sustainability in turn denies such assertions and argues that natural resources and 
biodiversity are integral parts of our existence as much as prerequisites for our mere 
physical and ontological survival. Adherents of this view believe that no manufactured 
substitutions can properly fill the niches growing vacant through severe resources 
depletion and malicious abuse of the environment. Similar as within the opposite 
approach, among the supporters of strong sustainability there are both experienced and 
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meticulous researchers appealing to the economic and statistical calculations and 
projections, and radical green philosophizing activists operating strictly with the notions 
of a sacred value and naturel rights that every element of biosphere bears in itself.41,42 
As it becomes more pronounced, the concept of sustainable development is 
multi-faceted and has many angles of perception. It has an eerie great potential both for 
corporate and political greenwashing – creating an appealing public image through 
conspicuous and often superficial concern for the environment and SD; nevertheless, it 
manages to establish a prospective framework of development that has a lasting 
capacity for bringing together disputing sides and channeling collective efforts to 
achieve a greater good. Bill Hopwood states in this regard - “The concept of SD 
represents a shift in understanding of humanity’s place on the planet, but it is open to 
interpretation of being anything from almost meaningless to of extreme importance to 
humanity”.43 He also makes an important remark and says that in terms of his 
researches he opts for using SD to “describe attempts to combine concerns with the 
environment and socio-economic issues. This i.a. illustrates the evolution of the 
concept. 
As can be seen, sustainable development is a fluid and capricious term to be 
employed with great caution. It can be a common ground, where conflicting parties can 
come up with consonant conclusions and positions. At the same time, it can be a point 
of discord, driving the discourse astray. Unlike the energy security notion, SD does not 
have an adamant conceptual core for adjustments to be built upon. Once resorted to, the 
SD should be meticulously conceptualized and framed, leaving enough flexibility to 
make broad strategic assumptions, yet tight enough so that the SD discourse does not 
negate itself by being too speculative and truistic. 
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1.3 Evolution of the sustainable development concept and its perception 
 
As the process of initial defining of SD and stipulating of the respective 
principles was concluded by 1980-ies, it took almost a decade for the issue and 
discussion to get a top international priority and made its way to the agenda of the most 
influential supranational organization – The United Nations. The United Nations’ 
Conference on Environment and Development, took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. It 
resulted in adoption of “Agenda 21” – a factual reassertion of the principles of SD as an 
undisputable value for the entire humankind on the highest possible level, coupled with 
the operational international framework for the concept and a set of guidelines for the 
regional and local governments to the implementation of these principles.44 As J. 
Spangenberg states, the conference attendees and the final paper authors succeeded at 
comprehensive documenting of the SD as a fusion of societal, economic and 
environmental issues and a political will for their resolution. Yet, what the conference 
and its product failed to achieve, according to the Spangenberg, is to “develop a 
common base of understanding regarding the core, the underlying driving forces of 
development and environment problems”.45 The main conceptual contradiction was 
between the positions of two camps. On the one side there were the US Administration 
and the EU governments who for decades enjoyed the benefits of the most advanced 
technological developments, hegemonic positions in the spheres of industrial 
manufacturing and cheap imports of natural resources, coupled with a tradition to 
outsource the most environmentally harmful productions to the countries of the third-
world. On the other side of the bargain were the governments of Latin America and 
Asia (although supported by US Democrats and European Social Democrats). They 
sought to limit this long-lasting monopoly of the global North – primarily due to 
economic reasons, but also due to the fact that their countries would be the first to face 
the consequences of the climate change and global resources depletion.46 Such 
dichotomy makes this conflict of interests particularly exceptional because it was one of 
few cases when the global South was in the vanguard of the humanitarian development, 
                                                          
44 ‘Agenda 21’ (presented at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil: United Nations Publications, 1992) 
45 Spangenberg, Joachim H., Stefanie Pfahl, and Kerstin Deller, ‘Towards Indicators for Institutional 
Sustainability: Lessons from an Analysis of Agenda 21’, Ecological Indicators, 2 (2002), 61–77 
46 Roddick, Jacqueline, ‘Earth Summit North and South: Building a Safe House in the Winds of Change’, 
Global Environmental Change, 7 (1997), 147–165 
26 
 
while the major Western countries were not particularly interested in its 
implementation.  
Another memorable and exemplary milestone in the process of ensuring 
sustainable development was the Kyoto protocol – an agreement (extending the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signed in 1998 by 15 
developed countries, which expressed an ambitious goal to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions by 5.2% by the year 2012 through the system of trading quotas for emitting.47 
From the very beginning, the initiative was heavily criticized for its limited number of 
participants, unviable mechanism of implementation and legal binding as much as for 
the cost-ineffective system of climate mitigation.48 Although some researchers and 
activists still keep advocating the Kyoto achievements, by the year 2015 a significant 
number of studies confirmed that the protocol did not manage to bring the participants 
to compliance with the goals set and had very insignificant positive effect on the 
emissions reduction.49  
The next important international endeavor to bolster sustainable development on 
the world scale was the Paris Agreement of 2015, which was the result of annual United 
Nations-led conference on climate change (Conference of the Parties, COP21). It 
incorporated the 1.5 - 2°C target on countering the global warming up to 2050, overview 
of the previous achievements, tightening of the goals every 5 years and a differentiated 
system of individual voluntary pledges made by participants called ‘Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions' (INDCs). According to the authors of the document, unlike 
the previous similar attempts (e.g. Kyoto) to tackle global SD issues, the Paris 
agreement included an elaborate system of environmental financing and the INDCs’ 
signees’ base representing around 95% of the global emissions.50 The agreement also 
caused a considerable amount of criticism: climate change researcher James Hansen at 
Columbia University says: “It’s just worthless words. There is no action, just promises. 
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As long as fossil fuels appear to be the cheapest fuels out there, they will be continued 
to be burned”.51 As adds Corinne Le Quere of the University of East Anglia in Norwich 
- “The emissions cuts promised by countries are still wholly insufficient”.52  
However, there are studies claiming that the Paris agreement actually wields a 
significant potential for a positive change. According to the calculations, the 
mechanisms stipulated by the document and INDCs allow mitigating climate change 
through improving the overall energy efficiency without misbalancing the states’ GDP. 
Moreover, although the 1.5 - 2°C target seems rather unrealistic in the given terms and 
circumstances, there are means existing that would allow bridging this gap between the 
pledges and an effective pathway towards climate change mitigation.53 Nevertheless, 
too little time has passed since the adoption for any comprehensive analysis on the 
outcomes; the first opportunity for this will hardly present itself earlier than in 2020, 
when the first official UN review of Paris agreement is scheduled.  
By the year 2017, the SD concept had around little less than 30 years to evolve 
and gain scientific support and opposition, develop various approaches and 
methodology, and acquire embodiments and representation in the adjacent spheres of 
human activities. Almost until the end of the 20th century the SD concept remained a 
concern of a rather narrow circle of researchers, academia related political activists and 
supra-national organizations such as aforementioned IUCN, WCED, United Nations, 
etc. But what is also of great importance is the public and business interpretation of the 
SD and perception of the concept’s implementation. 
Goldman Sachs Sustain Research Team points out 3 major stages in public and 
business attitude towards the issues of SD. The distinctive features of the early stage 
adoption (ca.1990-2000) were:  
 The lack of basic corporate awareness about the SD issues;  
 Scientific ambiguity of the concept’s viability;  
 Very secluded space that SD occupied within the system of social discourse;  
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 The risks posed by the SD implementation were deemed as overriding the 
benefits;  
 The benefits themselves were rather indistinct as much as the costs of 
exercising of the SD;  
 No coherent and comprehensive legal framework for business existed;  
 No major examples follow existed.  
 
The tipping point stage (2000-2009) that followed was marked with:  
 Increased business awareness;  
 Expansion of SD into the adjacent fields of social discourse;  
 Formation of a solid scientific background;  
 Materialization of the benefits, the costs become palpable;  
 Emergence and structuring of the regulatory framework;  
 Emergence of the respective market niches;  
 Proximity to the SD principles implementation starts to affect the corporate 
identity formation.  
 
Finally, the ongoing mainstream adaptation stage (from 2009 onwards) 
comprises:  
 All-encompassing influence of the SD trend on the business strategies;  
 Shareholders’ higher expectations regarding the adherence to SD;  
 Developed and comprehensive regulatory system;  
 Costs are relatively easily calculated, benefits are hardly disputed;  
 Expanding market of sustainable products and designs;  
 Stigmatization of the companies failing to comply with the SD principles.54  
 
The overall mood of the major companies’ CEOs (Chief Executive Officers) 
about SD penetrating the corporate strategies was expressed by Richard Edelmann for 
the UN study on business sustainability trends in 2013: “You can’t compartmentalize 
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sustainability anymore: everything is interrelated”.55 In addition, as highlighted by N. 
Lior, industry and commerce put a lot of effort into conceptualizing the sustainability in 
a way that would be applicable to the business strategies and goals. He gives an 
example of one of such “practical” definitions developed by the corporate researchers: 
“A sustainable product or process is one that constrains resource consumption and 
waste generation to an acceptable level, makes a positive contribution to the satisfaction 
of human needs, and provides enduring economic value to business enterprise”.56 
Although businesses taking responsibility for environmental protection and 
acknowledging the liability to take the concerns of SD into very close consideration - is 
of utmost importance, it is still the states and governments who remain the major actors 
defining the shape of SD system and the pace of its growth. As it was clear from the 
aforementioned conflict of interests between the global South and North at the UN 
conference in Rio in 1992, the governments can assume positions on the SD if not 
mutually excluding, then at least such that require a lot of time to find any points of 
compatibility on. Bill Hopwood analyzed the approaches towards sustainable 
development of various governmental, inter-governmental and supra-national structures 
and mapped using two axes: first - increasing socio-economic well-being and equality 
concerns; second – increasing environmental concerns. As a result, he managed to 
define three major patterns of dealing with SD issues that governments tent to adhere to 
– status quo, reform and transformation.57 
Status quo proponents in general do not dispute the necessity of political action 
for change, but they do not consider the environment as facing serious threats and do 
not agree that in the long run society will be affected by them. Usually such 
governments prioritize the national economic development strategy and entrust 
corporations and NGOs with a duty of the achieving sustainability goals. Since the 
study was conducted in 2005, it might seem that by 2017 major developed countries 
must have dropped such approach and stick to the principles of SD (at least formally). 
Yet the most vivid proof of this mapping’s validity is the recent (March 2017) exclusion 
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of climate change threat from the US national security strategy by the Administration of 
the President Donald Trump.58  
Reform camp hosts those who welcome the systematic change towards SD and 
hugely rely on the abilities of modern technologies, policies and science to mitigate the 
harm that is being inflicted onto the environment and redress the vector of world’s 
development. Nevertheless the reformists do not see the contemporary society as 
fundamentally flawed and the current course of actions predetermined by the existing 
political and economic structures as the one leading to the irredeemable harm being 
inflicted onto environment and undermining the future and well-being of humankind. 
Paradoxically enough Hopwood puts in this group a few of the most famous 
organizations promoting sustainability such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, WWF 
and Sierra Club. His main argument is that these organizations have significantly 
adapted to the existing legal systems of the developed countries and shifted from grass 
roots activism and protests to political lobbing and cooperation with governments, 
hence drifted away from “social issues of poverty or even the disproportionate share of 
pollution and other environmental issues”.  
Transformation approach represents the most radical viewpoint on the issues of 
SD and the nature of the modern society. According to this school of thought, the 
international society in its current form is moving towards an all-encompassing crisis in 
all spheres of human activity, should an acute and comprehensive transformation not 
occur. One of the major priorities of this view is social equity and strife for putting an 
end to the exploitation of the populations and global natural resources by a small 
minority of people. The author of this mapping acknowledges that this division is a 
simplification, yet it is likely that such method helps identifying the background and a 
typical toolkit of SD subject, as much as conducting a comparative analysis between 
various actors. Needless to say that signs of these approaches can be traced to the other 
spheres of governmental policies that gained a sustainable dimension and one of such 
spheres is energy security. 
As shown above, since 1980s when the SD concept was presented to the public, 
it has gained a significant amount of supporters and made it to the top agendas of the 
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leading states, intergovernmental organizations, and influential transnational 
corporations. It indicates that in spite of the ambiguity of the concept the major actors 
involved in the world’s development recognize it as bearing a significant potential for 
improving the living standards worldwide. By analogy with ES, SD unfolds into 
multiple approaches, stages and schools of thought, in order to adjust to particular aims 
set by an actor. Undoubtedly, certain failures are inevitable – such as Kyoto Protocol 
endeavor – yet, applied reasonably, SD can offer a powerful and reliable tool for 
analysis, assessment and improvement. 
Thus, the international and social framework, where SD dwells and develops is 
being presented. It must be noted, when the impact on the US energy security system is 
being assessed. It is clear that there are distinctive support and opposition camps both 
on the international arena (global South and global North) and the US national scale 
(Democrats and Republicans), which should also be accounted for. The major failures 
and achievements of SD shall mark the most probable obstacles and effective ways for 
integration into the US energy security paradigm. Also the business community is an 
integral party of the American energy industry. This point has especially significant 
importance in the light of the twofold situation – on the one hand the US major energy 
companies have notably benefited from the achievements of shale industry. Yet at the 
same time they have embraced (to a varying degree) the principles and ways of energy 
efficiency, green economy and sustainable development – not least under the public 
pressure. Hence, to a significant extent the success of SD within the energy security 
paradigm depends on the major companies’ acceptance of the respective principles and 
notions, as much as on the readiness to partly sacrifice the shale revenues for the 
national interests and public good.  
 
1.4 Sustainable dimension of energy security 
 
Sustainable (environmental) stewardship dimension of ES started to draw 
academic and political attention not so long time ago. Although the developed countries 
recognized its integral part in the framework of energy security, its factual 
implementation is far from complete. In 1987 the WCED designed the list of 
operational principles of SD: 
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 Reviving growth; 
 Changing the quality of growth; 
 Meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water, and sanitation; 
 Ensuring a sustainable level of population; 
 Conserving and enhancing the resource base; 
 Reorienting technology and managing risk;  
 Merging environmental and economic concerns in decision making; 
 Reorienting international economic relations.59 
 
These principles potentially could form the framework for implementation the 
SD dimension into a national energy security strategy, yet the process faces a few 
complications. One of the most important tools for measuring a state’s energy security 
and developing a comprehensive national energy strategy is an ES index. ES indices are 
sets of interconnected variables affecting the overall state of ES. Measuring these 
variables researchers can make projections, build scenarios and assess various aspects of 
ES. Different indicators used by an index allow emphasizing various side of an issue. In 
this regard, Benjamin K. Sovacool claims the following: “Geopolitical relationships or 
trade flows are seldom included, and other dimensions such as sustainability or equity 
or efficiency are often ignored”. In order to expand the focus of the energy security 
scrutiny Sovacool re-conceptualized it and suggested a modernized definition. It states 
that energy security seeks to “equitably provide available, affordable, reliable, efficient, 
environmentally benign, proactively governed and socially acceptable energy services 
to end-users”.60 He was not the first one to incorporate the principles of sustainable 
development into the definition of ES, but he managed to sublimate it and isolate the 
integral components of sustainability in the forms applicable for the ES structure. At the 
UN summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, a triangle of sustainability was introduced – three 
pillars, on which sustainability rests, are environment, economy and society.61 We can 
directly track the migration of these ideas into the definition proposed by Sovacool - 
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environmental, economic and societal concerns are represented there through the 
notions of environmental benignity, efficiency and social acceptability respectively. For 
this reason, the definition of Benjamin Sovacool should be deemed as operational for 
this research. 
In order to place the SD concept within the framework of ES a remark made by 
International Energy Agency (IEA) should be mentioned. In the research published in 
2007, where IEA assessed the interactions between energy security and climate policy, 
two important statements are made. Firstly, argues IEA, fostering the sustainable 
stewardship dimension of ES does not affect negatively the resilience of the overall 
energy system as much as the capacity to withstand short-term systemic shocks; 
moreover it does not jeopardize the ability of national operators to balance the supply, 
demand and prices on the market in the short-run. Secondly, it is claimed that 
sustainable development being a long-term all-encompassing concept should be 
perceived, assessed and implemented into the national energy security system solely 
through and within the strategic dimension of ES.62 Among the aforementioned integral 
principles of sustainable energy security (SEC), the notion of environmental protection 
wields the most strategic and long-term nature, at the same time it is the one hardest to 
bolster and the one most ignored by the governments and business. As for the latter, it is 
pointless to await any significant voluntary developments in this regard from the 
corporations. It is argued by S. Brown and H. Huntington that huge businesses 
operating in the private markets, which are in any way affiliated with energy 
commodities or financial flows, are very unlikely to promote the environmental 
protection. It is fatuous to expect from them such measures as altruistic investing in 
specific alternative sources of energy, conservation technologies, and emissions 
reduction systems etc., which would result in long-term strengthening of national 
energy security. The researchers apprehend such behavior from the market players due 
to the basic economic reasoning – “enhanced energy security and reduced greenhouse 
gas emissions confer external benefits that are not reflected in private market pricing”. It 
is suggested for the governments to form public policies that would make these external 
benefits palpable and measurable for the businesses, so that the corporations engaged in 
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the process sustaining the ES.63 While this suggestion embodies a metaphorical “carrot” 
for market, we could assume that it might be practical for governments also to exploit a 
respective “stick”. Today there is no denying of the increased strength of casual linkage 
between the consumers as public shareholders and businesses as executive managers for 
natural resources; as much as of the acutely augmented ability of the former ones to 
influence the decisions of the latter ones (in some cases even the capitalization of their 
companies). In these circumstances, a strategically correct move would be for national 
authorities to promote the green image of energy industry, educate population about the 
sustainable and environmental issues, and highlight the positive and negative roles that 
energy companies might play in the process of ensuring the national sustainable 
stewardship. Thus opens an opportunity to influence indirectly the private energy 
companies through encouraging the population to pressurize the businesses into 
complying with the public expectations. As it was in the case of SD concept in general, 
that it is the responsibility of state authorities to implement the sustainable stewardship 
dimension. 
According to Sovacool, the first and the most important step to be undertaken in 
this regard, which is also the easiest in the given conditions – is controlling the SO2 and 
CO2 emissions.
64 These greenhouse gases (GHG) prevent heat from escaping the Earth’s 
atmosphere, which results in climate change and global warming.65 The reason why the 
sustainability dimension and its environmental element are essential for the ES is that 
energy productions activities account for more than 68% of the global greenhouse 
emissions by the year 2016.66 Direct and indirect repercussions of overlooking the 
sustainable energy security include global temperature rise at exponential rate; crisis in 
water supply since the resources extraction, transformation and transportation require 
immense amounts of fresh water; food (biomass)-to-fuel conversion causes 
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interruptions in foodstuffs supply and the price increase. The “Living Planet Index” has 
dropped by 30% since 1970, while the “Ecological Footprint” grew in 2.4 times.67  
The next element of sustainability is economy and as it has already been 
mentioned – within the system of ES it is expressed through the notions of economic 
stability and energy efficiency. It is beyond any doubt that energy supply and 
infrastructure is an essential prerequisite for a state’s economy functioning. Insecurity of 
sustainable energy stewardship poses multiple threats for the economy; as X. 
Labandeira and B. Manzano explain – there are two sets of energy-related externalities 
affecting a national economy – volume and price. Firstly, it is a dichotomy between 
energy-exporters, who largely adhere to a non-competitive market system, and energy-
importers, who, if they exercise a competitive market system, can be under risk of 
malicious supply volume manipulations performed by the former ones. This results in 
importer’s market failure, supply disruptions and economic shocks. The second set of 
externalities affecting the economy is connected to the repercussions of energy 
resources’ price volatility. When an energy commodity is subject to cost fluctuations, a 
national market system is not flexible enough and sustainable energy stewardship is not 
sufficiently implemented – the consequences will hit the economy, most severely – the 
labour and energy-intensive capital markets.68 A direct counteraction to these threats 
usually involves hoarding the biggest amount of energy resources, desolation of 
national territories in attempt to discover new oil, gas or coal extraction sites, or 
intensifying the production at already existing ones. Yet according to a number of 
studies, the most reasonable and feasible way for a state to tackle the issues of 
increasing energy resources costs (hence the price volatility) in a sustainable manner – 
is to foster the overall energy efficiency. Bolstering an efficient resource use and 
reducing energy intensity of industry results in market stabilization, rise of employment 
rates and national competitiveness.69 For this very reason, energy efficiency is an 
integral part of a sustainable ES. 
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Lastly, the third element of sustainable energy stewardship is social 
acceptability. Apart from already mentioned concern for employment rates and 
providing a labour market with new positions, this part of SEC is closely linked to the 
notion of justice - or energy justice in particular. Nowadays the concept is presented as a 
fusion of international and intercultural moral and ethical complexes applied to the 
issues of energy security and development. This resultant aggregate postulates the 
following principles: 
 Local scale efforts for bolstering energy efficiency and resources solutions; 
 Human rights priority along the entire process of energy-related projects 
realization; 
 Minimization of energy infrastructure and processes impact on the society 
and addressing poverty by providing an affordable energy access for 
population; 
 Ensuring the compatibility of the energy systems developments with the 
local communities and cultural codes;  
 Abstaining from initiating irredeemable local ecosystems’ transformations 
for the sake of ensuring ES.70 
 
One important fact about the sustainability trend penetrating the framework of 
ES – is that it was made possible due to the recent developments in the field of 
unconventional energy resources. Permanent and ubiquitous endeavors of the states to 
secure an access to energy supplies, heated by the theories and projections about the 
soon-to-be oil and gas depletion, were mitigated by the discoveries of oil sands, extra 
heavy crude oil, coal bed natural gas, tight gas, shale gas and oil, as much as the means 
for their extractions. The postponed ‘end of fossil fuels’ on the one hand reduced the 
states’ hunger for renewables, but at the same time it relieved the tension on the fuels 
market. This very respite from power struggle over the expiring resources opened a 
window of opportunity for sustainability, effectiveness and environmental concerns. 
Ironically enough many of these new unconventional and previously inaccessible 
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resources bear a significant potential for harming the environment, economies and 
society, thus stultifying the achievements of sustainable energy security process.71  
In other words, the framework and goals of sustainable energy development, 
outlined by the most eminent researchers and exercised by intergovernmental 
organizations may occur to be incompatible with the source of the US’ current resource 
abundance. For the United States as the energy producing and consuming vanguard of 
the planet the matter of one top-priority national interest (energy security) comes into 
contradiction with another one (sustainable development) is of the utmost importance. 
And as the aforementioned environmental statistics and assessments clearly demonstrate 
- it is essential to assess the compatibility of the latest energy industry developments 
and the energy security paradigm updated with the sustainability component.  
One of the most vivid and disputed examples of such contradiction would be the 
Shale revolution in the United States. 
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Chapter 2 – Energy security framework of the United States of America 
2.1 US strategic energy premises and the evolution of the ES  
Being the world biggest economy and one of the most influential players at the 
international arena the United States naturally possesses a complex, sophisticated and 
ramified energy system. In order to assess the US energy security strategy, its evolution, 
peculiarities, significance of sustainability dimension and unconventional resources – a 
groundwork overview of the energy input data and the principle starting positions of the 
United States is essential. One of the most reliable and meticulous institutions providing 
such information is the International Energy Agency (IEA). IEA regularly conducts in-
depth analyses of the states’ energy systems and publishes verifiable and comprehensive 
reports.  
In the case of USA the last two major reports are dated 2008 and 2013, which 
both covers the most significant for the country recent events e.g. the world economic 
crisis or Shale revolution; and enables an observer to track the operational evolution of 
the US energy system in the short run. The total primary energy supply (TPES) of the 
US in 2013 was 2186.7 million tons of oil-equivalent with the following shares: oil 
(35.9%), natural gas (27.8%), coal is closing the major trinity (19.9%); the minorities 
are nuclear power (9.8%), biofuels and waste (4.2%), hydro (1.1%), wind (0.7%), 
geothermal (0.4%) and solar (0.1%). Due to the achievements of the unconventional oil 
and natural gas industry the share of coal is decreasing – 20% contraction. The US is 
energy self-sufficient by around 83% and steadily moves towards full energy 
independence. Energy consumption share are as follows: transport (41.7%), industry 
(24.6%), residential sector (17.7%), commercial sector (15.9%); the consumption was in 
decreasing trend for the past decade in each sector except for transport.72  
An important part of the US energy history is the gigantic oil corporation – 
Standard Oil – established in 1870 by John D. Rockefeller and dominated the US 
energy markets both before 1911 and after when it was divided into 34 companies due 
to the anti-trust act of the Supreme Court of the US.73 For almost a century, the 
corporate strategy of Standard Oil and later its successors defined the national energy 
agenda in the US. It was achieved through both managing the physical supplies of the 
                                                          
72 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries - the United States (IEA, 2014) 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/USA_2014.pdf> 
73 Yergin, Daniel, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (Simon and Schuster, 2012) 
39 
 
country and actively engaging into politics by sponsoring the politicians and lobbying 
through them corporate interests up until 1970s when their abilities to influence the 
national policies got restricted and taken over by the federal authorities.74 Yet it should 
be noted that there is no unidirectional all-encompassing national energy strategy in the 
US, for that reason, such institutions as the US Department of Energy (DOE) or the 
President Administration have been heavily criticized. Nevertheless, the evolution and 
contemporary vector (at least declarative) of the US energy policy can be constructed by 
combining and juxtaposing the fundamental principles expressed in the series of 
legislative acts adopted between mid-1970s and nowadays.  
The major trend of the governmental concern for energy security started in the 
US for the same reasons the IEA was established – the energy crisis of 1973 and its first 
high-ranking champion was the 39th President of the United States James Earl Carter. 
Almost right away after entering the office, he proclaimed a new initiative - National 
Energy Plan. It aimed at reducing American dependence on external suppliers; 
bolstering the domestic coal production; equalizing and adjusting the energy tax system 
in correspondence with the goals set. Yet the Carter’s initiative did not pass through the 
Congress in its initial form due to a number of reasons. First of all, the Members of 
Congress had their reservations about the origins of the 1973 energy shock – due to the 
aforementioned overwhelming historical influence of the American corporations on the 
natural resources industry and politics they tended to blame the internal Standard Oil 
subsidiaries for the crisis outbreak rather than external factors. Moreover, Carter’s plan 
had serious flaws – it did not envisage a comprehensive reform of energy industry – i.e. 
left intact the supreme corporate control over the market and ignored the issue of $100 
billion worth loopholes in the tax legislation enjoyed by the energy companies. 
Additionally, the plan sought to reconcile the interests of the opposite parties such as 
producers and consumers, labour and industry, environmentalists and capitalists – while 
the idea as such was commendable, politicians, economy and society were not ready for 
such transformations right away.75  
Nevertheless, the crisis of 1973 and the Carter’s initiative gave an initial impetus 
for the discussions at the US federal level and concerns over energy security, 
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development and independence. Since then the United States legislators and 
government created a series of acts and laws constituting the framework of American 
energy policy. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 – drew a distinctive line between a 
civil nuclear power and military researches.76 Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975 – set the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, auto fuel economy principles.77 Department 
of Energy Organization Act – established the Department of Energy and endowed it 
with duties to develop and implement countries energy programs and strategies at the 
Cabinet level.78 National Energy Act of 1978 – tackled the taxation issues and 
loopholes, created a legal basis for alternative fuels development and energy efficient 
systems.79 Energy Security Act of 1980 – a major legislative initiative that regulated the 
synthetic, biomass and alcohol fuels management, set energy target up to 2000, 
bolstered renewables-related and geothermal energy initiatives.80 Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1982 – arranged nuclear waste repository sites and disposal rules.81 Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 – created a set of rules for wide-scale electricity generation, 
financially incentivized eco-friendly autos construction and usage, bolstered the overall 
natural gas production and consumption regulation.82 Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 – arranged a comprehensive funding of biofuels, renewables, 
and energy efficient products development aiming at tackling energy security exposures 
and GHG emissions related climate change.83 Energy Policy Act of 2005 – fosters 
efficient and responsible domestic energy production and consumption, introduces 
energy consumption monitoring system for public utilities, increases required share of 
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renewables in the domestic gasoline pool.84 Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 – further promoted energy conservation through standardization measures applied 
to federal fleets, obliged federal constructions to use Energy Star (eco-friendliness index 
scale) certified products, financially supported small enterprises developing energy 
efficient systems.85 The most recent documents defining the US contemporary energy 
strategy are “President’s Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future” of 2011, “All-of-the-
Above Energy Strategy” of 2012 and DOE’s “Strategic Plan 2014-2018”.  
According to them the today’s major energy-related goals of the US comprise:   
 Support for economic growth and job creation;  
 Enhanced energy security;  
 Deployment of low-carbon energy technologies; increasing of the renewables’ share 
in TPES;  
 Reduction of energy-imports dependence;  
 Increasing of the energy efficiency;  
 Modernization of energy infrastructure;  
 Ensuring nuclear security;  
 Further development of the countries previously inaccessible resources;  
 Addressing climate change through bolstering emission-responsible energy 
system.86  
 
Yet the incumbent US President Donald Trump and his administration disputed 
the significance of the last point on the climate change and led the US to the 
abandonment of the Paris Agreement.87 Hence it should be expected that at least in the 
period of 2016-2020 the emission reduction and environmental stewardship agenda will 
dwell in a questionable position in the US. Overviewing the series of the documents 
adopted by the US authorities in order to regulate the energy systems, security and 
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development, one can rather accurately distinguish the phases that American energy 
legislature went through. From securing the fundamental resources supplies and 
principles of conservation and economy in mid-1970s to arranging financial and 
taxation background for the comprehensive development of the traditional resources 
base in late 1970s. From creating a favorable environment for introducing new forms of 
energy and bolstering energy independence in 1980s to establishing a framework for 
more sustainable and responsible energy development in 1990s, and finally directly 
addressing GHG emissions and climate change issues while supporting eco-friendly 
energy businesses and products nation-wide in 2000s. 
One of the major drivers for the development of the US energy security 
framework has always been the American armed forces – namely the Department of 
Defense (DOD). On the one hand the share of DOD in the US energy consumption is 
rather low – about 1% (yet the multiple DOD-affiliated civilian facilities’ consumption 
has not been accounted for). On the other hand DOD’s bond with energy policies is 
tight and double-edged – the US military forces is the party with a particularly 
significant aptitude for influencing the national energy agenda; simultaneously the very 
same party is one of the first to be affected by the changes and turbulences both in the 
world energy supplies system and in national ES. Being a very moderate consumer in 
terms of overall share, DOD is the biggest single-entity energy purchaser in the US, 
which consumes around 80% of the energy being provided for the Federal 
Government.88  
There are three dimensions of connection between energy related issues and the 
US army. First, it is a combat dimension; Deloitte – one of the most prominent audit 
and consultancy firms - analyzed the energy consumption patterns of the US military 
forces in all the wars and armed conflicts for the past 70 years. They concluded that the 
daily fuel consumption per soldier had grown by 175% since the end of Vietnam War of 
1975. This is both the result of significantly increased distances that armed forces tend 
to cover nowadays in order to engage in warfare and advanced military machinery, 
which new generations require more and more energy inputs – especially the aviation.89 
Secondly, the energy-pricing conundrum disturbs DOD. It is a market law that 
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increased demand leads to increased prices. While there is still a heated debate on the 
extent of impact that particular military conflicts had on the oil prices,90 there is 
evidence that growing military demand for oil coupled with market expectation of 
armed conflicts causes disturbances in energy resources pricing,91  
This also includes the issue of chokepoints – naturally narrow pathways along 
the energy resources delivery routes that can be easily blocked, what would lead to an 
acute disruption in energy supplies and cause an economic shock. Straits of Malacca, 
Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Bosporus and Dardanelle as much as Suez and Panama 
Canals present such chokepoints. In order to secure them the DOD spends annually $74 
billion.92 This not only costs a lot but also makes problematic the long-term budgetary 
planning and operational expenses scheduling for DOD, which only bolsters the 
concern of the latter over national energy security and independence. At last, thirdly, 
and quite surprisingly for many observers, it is the concern of the US military 
authorities over the environmental and climate issues caused by irresponsible and 
predacious energy policies.  
Yet, it is hardly a pure altruistic concern. In 2007 an assembly of top-ranked US 
veterans published a comprehensive report on interrelatedness of warfare and the global 
environment – they underlined that repercussions of climate change comprise “the 
disruption of agricultural production patterns, the disruption of water availability”, 
which eventually results in compromising the defensive ability of the US National 
military forces and hindering the overseas operations and strategies.93 Reflecting the 
concerns of the retired generals and admirals DOD in 2010 rolled out their own 
assessment of the climate change potential impact. They concluded that it poses a 
significant threat to the world’s political stability, since it causes impoverishment of 
populations, shortages of supplies and loosening already brittle states. Further 
elaborating on the troublesomeness of the issue for the military actors, the report clears 
up that unsustainable development leading to climate change will not directly provoke a 
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war. Nevertheless, it will create a predisposition of the governments and societies to 
failure; in such conditions rampant crime, arbitrariness of paramilitary organizations 
and outrage of various radical extremist groups are almost inevitable and the military 
forces will the one actor to bear the brunt and try to stabilize such emerging conflict 
zones.94  
Moreover, it is not always the well-being of the foreign states, regimes and 
societies the US officials worry about. In the Presidential Administration’s National 
Security Strategy of 2010, it is clearly stated that the dependence of the United Stated 
on the overseas supplies of energy resources coupled with negative consequences of 
unsustainable development and climate change could result in broadening the American 
exposure before the systemic economic shocks and political crises.95 
Apart from military officials, there are of course other interested actors with a 
varying ability of influencing the state’s energy policies in the United States. Benjamin 
Sovacool outlines out the following ones:  
 Federal government;  
 Private sector (PS) – represented not only by huge corporations but also minor 
extracting and refining companies due to the specificities of the American subsoil 
use legislation;  
 Academia – primarily as a provider of expert researches and specialized 
assessments;  
 Non-profit organizations (NPO) – mainly counterbalancing the self-serving interests 
of corporations and promoting the social justice and sustainable development of 
energy policies; 
 Intergovernmental structures (IS) – who attempt to channel the cumulative power of 
the states for the sake of global goals and usually project the influence through the 
international pacts and agreements bounding the US to certain liabilities.  
All these actors foster those dimensions of the national energy security that 
deem the most relevant. Currently seven distinctive directions can be isolated within the 
US energy strategy: 
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 Security of trade and supply – which comprises all the concerns over the energy 
dependence and the related risks (most highly rated by the government and IS; least 
rated by NPO and academia);  
 Energy democracy – namely the promotion of decentralization of energy-related 
decision making, endowing the local authorities and communities with the power to 
design the siting and deployment of energy facilities as much as the share of fuels in 
overall consumption (least rated by PS and IS);  
 Energy research – as a major mean of the new technologies development and 
practical application (most rated by IS, NPO and PS; least rated by the government);  
 Energy efficiency;  
 Affordability – including the concerns over market related issues and energy prices 
manipulations; environmental pollution (little deviation by influence sector, yet 
various age groups rate the dimension differently); 
 Climate change (most rated by NPO and academia, least rated by PS and IS).96 
Yet the main energy related concern among the US policy-makers is still the 
dependence on energy exports. On the one hand the dependence on the supplies from 
assumedly structurally unstable and politically unpredictable regimes constituting the 
majority of the OPEC members is rather high. In 2016 USA imported 3.75 million 
barrels of crude oil and petroleum products per day, which is accounted to more than 
one third of the overall oil imports, and despite the fluctuations over the years this 
number does not change significantly in the last three decades.97 However, the very 
need for enormous amounts of energy is the gigantic American economy – serving the 
needs of 4.5 percent of the world’s population it consumes around 27% of the energy 
globally produced – in 2016, the number was 2.196 million tons of oil equivalent 
(mtoe), which is second only to China with 3.101 mtoe.98 The total consumption by 
sector in the US is as follows: electricity generation - 39%; transportation - 28%; 
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industry and construction - 22%; residential sector - 7%; commercial usage - 4%.99 This 
ratio varies by the county in accordance with the economic specialization of the region 
and the national industry specificities; each sector is usually being subjected to reforms 
aiming at energy intensity reduction and energy efficiency increase. Yet, what 
distinguishes the American energy consumption pattern is the share of transport in GHG 
emission. While among the top ten GHG emitters (UK, Canada, Germany, Japan, India, 
Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, China) this share is between 7-20%, in the United States 
transport is accounted for 27% of the overall GHG emissions.100,101  
This can be explained not only by the enormous number of cars registered in the 
US – 263.6 million in 2015 – but also by the notorious affinity of the US citizens for 
driving oversized vehicles. So called “Gas Guzzlers”, SUV (Sport-Utility vehicle) or 
simply light trucks, which consume proportionally a lot more gasoline per distance unit 
in comparison to regular-sized sedans popular in Europe.102 While in 2008 after the oil – 
hence gasoline – prices skyrocketed, the sales of large cars showed a downtrend, now 
with the fuel prices stabilized at a moderate level the North-American consumers turned 
to the SUVs again, which proves a persistent cultural and public demand for this type of 
transport.103 In turn, this national peculiarity might help to understand the logic behind 
the US ways of ensuring energy security and dealing with threats.  
There is no denying the fact that energy dependence has always been threatening 
the national security of the United States – not only from the prospective of energy 
supplies disruptions. It was asserted by the Energy Security Leadership Council in 2006 
that by importing oil from the Middle East the US is technically sponsoring the 
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ideological adversaries with a pronounced anti-American political agenda, which in 
terms of strategic military planning equals to shooting oneself in the foot.104  
At the same time, there are clear evidences of both direct and harmful impact of 
the American energy utilization on the global environment, which in turn, as has been 
also stated by the military specialists in the aforementioned report of CNA Corporation, 
may have negative consequences for the US national interests. Moreover, it is almost a 
truism that by bolstering the domestic resources exploration and renewable energy 
industry both the issue of energy exports dependence and the environmental problems 
can be tackled.  
Yet there are a few reasons why America stalled in this regard until the 
beginning of the 2010s. Firstly, it would have been infeasible to substitute the energy 
imports from the Middle East with the domestically produced resources due to a 
significant depletion of the traditional oil reservoirs; those deposits that remain 
relatively intact are pronounced as “off-limits zones” for extraction by the majority of 
politicians at least for the time being. These zones, such as Alaska or Eastern coastline, 
are particularly susceptible to the harmful and destructive procedures accompanying 
every serious mining and extracting activity, and the environmental lobby bolstered by 
the majority of population disapproving the idea of ruining the national natural heritage 
and simply the highly populated sites, manages to hold back the encroachments on these 
zones.105 Secondly, the most abundant energy resource in the US’ possession remained 
to be coal until mid-2010s – its production peaked in 2008 and it was the major source 
of electricity in the country.106  
Nevertheless the extraction pace could not be significantly enlarged because of 
the coal GHG emission ratio: it is one of the dirtiest sources of energy – petroleum 
produces around 75% as much carbon dioxide per unit of energy and natural gas only 
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50%.107 With the amounts of GHG already being emitted by the US economy, the 
further expansion in this field might have caused a number of objections both from the 
domestic eco-activists and from the international community. However, at the same 
time the production could not be reduced for the sake of the renewable sources of 
energy development and promotion of the sustainable energy security, because interests 
of multiple actors on all levels would have been disturbed. Such a shift would entail the 
infringement of well-being of coal-fired power plants owners, consumers of energy 
provided by those power plants, directly mine-workers, all the contractors involved in 
the transportation of coal – especially the railway enterprises, and of course the trading 
companies.108 More than that, and here we get back to the example of the North 
America’s vehicles preferences - the US citizens, businesses and the entire economy are 
very much accustomed to cheap, affordable and easily accessible fuels - especially oil 
and gasoline. With an exception of the most developed East and West coasts the United 
States have always been rather reluctant at saving energy, employing the renewable 
resources use on the mass scale, and implementing energy effective systems. The major 
producers and importers of fossil fuels in cooperation with the auto-industries had at 
their disposal a proven and functioning infrastructure, distribution systems, contractors 
and client-bases – hence were interested in maintaining the status quo.109  
In other words, the US authorities for almost four decades since the oil crisis of 
1973 found themselves trying to resolve the conundrum of contradictory and often 
mutually excluding trends. Among those were the need for energy independence; 
hostility of the energy suppliers; eco-standards to comply with promoted by 
environmental lobby; pressure from the military officials and top business enterprises 
trying to secure their interests; and the scarcity of domestic energy resources or inability 
to access them. Given all aforementioned conditions, the Shale revolution might seem 
not only logical but also almost inevitable solution. 
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2.2 Shale revolution: historical origins and political consequences  
 
Shale resources are the same types of energy commodities as the ones produced 
conventionally; the only difference is in the specificity of their natural bedding and 
distribution. Such resources are usually bedded deeper than conventional reservoirs 
containing oil, gas or coal, and entrapped either within the natural airtight shale rock 
basins with low permeability or proximately in the matter of shale rocks. Due to the 
extraction and utilization considerations, as much as because of the aforementioned 
preconditions of the American energy system requiring huge amounts of domestically 
produced clean energy resource – shale gas production is the most prominent direction 
in this regard.110 Light tight oil is also an important component of shale revolution, but 
it has less impact on the market and national energy security for two reasons. Firstly, the 
American shale gas reserves are much more abundant in relation to the national 
markets, which quantitatively increases the end-influence. Secondly, despite the 
developments in international gas transportation, it remains mainly a local fuel and a 
sharp rise in its domestic production has more profound effects on the national economy 
and energy security than tight oil production, which direct impact can be dispersed by 
flexibility and volatility of the world oil markets, as much as multiplicity and 
interchangeability of suppliers.111 For these reasons, the primary attention will be paid 
to the shale gas production as a manifestation and embodiment of shale revolution.  
Shale gas can be considered as previously inaccessible resource, yet with a few 
provisos. Technically the first documented shale well was drilled in the US already in 
1821 and the gas from it was successfully extracted and delivered to a limited number 
of local consumers in the Fredonia town. By the end of 19th century, multiple attempts 
to organize an industrial production of shale gas had taken place, however, most of the 
discovered shale beds appeared to be empty, aside from few exceptions. More than that, 
the emerging conventional oil and gas production industry hindered the development of 
its shale counterpart due to the comparatively low depth of occurrence of conventional 
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resources reservoirs and their easy accessibility.112 In late 1940s, the technology of 
hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) was introduced for accessing shale resources and their 
extraction stimulation.  
Modern fracking process involves several stages. First, it is a directional boring 
(discovered in the beginning of the 20th century) and especially horizontal drilling 
(developed only in 1960s) allowing reaching underground resources inaccessible to the 
conventional vertical drilling – such as offshore sites, reservoirs under the rivers and 
populated areas, or beneath the mountainous terrains.113 Secondly, a mix of water and 
chemicals is pumped into the shaft at a high pressure in order to create fissures in shale 
monoliths, solidify newly formed crevices and stimulate the contents to flow to the 
collector. Finally, the waste fluids (flowback or produced water) are being disposed of 
by dumping into the local waters or injecting into underground storages.114  
Thus, by 1970s the technical possibilities for shale gas extraction were already 
there as much as the discovered major reservoirs (yet the biggest Barnett Shale and 
Marcellus sites were considered to be of an exceptionally low permeability, hence the 
extraction was deemed inexpedient).115 Two major energy crises (1973 – of the OPEC’s 
embargo on exports to the US; 1979 – of the Iranian revolution and subsequent drop in 
supplies) created a tension in the American society, sufficient for making a search for a 
domestic energy resource a national strategic priority. A number of institutions 
dedicated exclusively to the shale industry development were created - the most 
prominent were the DOE’s Eastern Gas Shale Project as a complex network of 
researches and studies concerning the technical and engineering dimension of shale 
production. Among them were the Gas Research Institute specializing on the supply, 
transmission, distribution and end use segment; and National Energy Technology 
Laboratory focusing on the respective infrastructural issues.116,117,118  
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 All the past developments came in practical and by the beginning of the 2000s; 
the shale gas production grew sevenfold.119 According to the Energy Information 
Agency of the United States, by 2016 there were around 200 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of 
the proven reserves of recoverable shale gas in the US, which is more than a half of the 
state’s overall gas reserves.120 The annual production of shale gas is at about 15.2 Tcf, 
which is around half of the overall natural gas production (28.3 Tcf) and consumption 
(27.5 Tcf) of in 2016.121,122  
Considering only proven, technically recoverable and reliable resources this will 
suffice for several decades of consumption in the US, and if the unproven and so far 
technically inaccessible resources are taken into consideration the estimated time that 
American domestic gas production can provide for the country is almost reaching a 
century (yet only if the consumption level remains the same).123 
Apart from technological development and political circumstances that bolstered 
the shale revolution it also was the national business and market structure – with a 
traditionally great many of small and middle-sized flexible energy enterprises ready to 
take risks – and the very geological conditions of the American soil that played into the 
hands of the industry. The importance of these factors becomes especially evidential 
after analyzing the reasons behind the failure of China to establish its own shale gas 
industry. In China the authorities tried to tap into the national shale reserves through the 
means of semi-command economy and administrative tools on the very short-term 
scale. While in the US, it took more than 200 thousand drilled wells and 60 years of 
continuous endeavors of the various independent players on the free competitive market 
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to make the shale gas production feasible and profitable.124 Moreover, in terms of 
geological conditions the US happened to be in the favorable position: not only is the 
bedding depth of the shale reserves much more convenient in America – 800-2600 
meters against 2000-3500 in China. More than that, the very structure of American soils 
is more friable and susceptible to the hydraulic fracturing – contrary to the Chinese 
clayey and resilient bedrocks.125  
Impact of the shale revolution was profound and was not limited to the US 
energy industry or national borders, it also resulted in transformation of international 
energy relations and trade flows. However, the most prompt and significant changes 
took place within the country initiated the full-scale shale development. Primarily, the 
United States managed to strengthen the national energy security by eliminating 
dependence on external natural gas imports, meet the inner demand by the means of 
domestic production and achieve self-sufficiency in this regard. Coupled with the 
consistent policy of oil-imports diversification – namely reducing the share of OPEC 
countries in import pool from almost a half to less than one third and empowering 
Canada as a main current oil supplier along with multiple minor exporters. Shale 
revolution allowed the US to enjoy the benefits of one of the most secure, flexible and 
independent energy systems worldwide.126  
The share of natural gas in electricity generation increased from 13% in 1996 to 
34% in 2016, partially substituting for coal and reducing its share from 53% to 30% for 
the respective period.127 According to the in-depth research of the IHS Global Insight 
conducted for the America’s Natural Gas Alliance in 2011, the development of the 
unconventional gas industries led to the evidential economic growth in the US. Due to 
the so called “employment multiplier” effect of the shale industries that heavily rely on 
the services of multiple subcontractors from almost every economic sphere, the national 
labour market capacity increased significantly – more than half a million jobs were 
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created directly or intermediately as a result of shale revolution by 2011 and the 
projections suggest this trend will continue.128  
However, as stated by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office the national GDP 
will not be boosted by the shale industries’ support of the job market to any 
considerable extent because most of the labour force will be relocated from different 
production and service segments. Therefore, despite of the increased overall job-market 
capacity, the factual monetary outcome will be moderate.129 Nevertheless, the shale 
industry gives the American GDP a notable impetus for growth even unassisted by the 
employment multiplier factor – in 2010, the total contribution of shale gas development 
to the GDP was $76.8 billion and $18.6 billion as tax revenues.130 As soon as in 2014 
the contribution to the GDP reached $430 billion, the number of jobs supported grew to 
2.7 million and the fiscal revenues covered 13% of the federal budget deficit.131 
To the upswing in shale gas production is usually attributed the displacement of 
coal in the overall US energy consumption and in the electricity generation mix in 
particular. There is an evidential causation linkage between the reduction in coal usage 
at the power plants and a respective increase of the shale gas share taking over the free 
niche. In 2015 the overall production and consumption of coal decreased by 10% from 
around 1.1 billion short tons (Bst) to 0.9 Bst.132 
According the EIA, one of the major drivers of this trend are the Northeast 
states, who have been opting in favor of shale gas for the past decade and brought its 
share in local electricity production from 23% in 2006 to 41% in 2016.133 These shifts 
are caused not only and not so much due to the environmental benefits of natural gas 
                                                          
128 IHS Global Insight (USA) Inc., The Economic and Employment Contributions of Shale Gas in the 
United States (Washington DC: America’s Natural Gas Alliance, December 2011) 
<http://energyindepth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Shale-Gas-Economic-Impact-Dec-
2011_EMB1.pdf> 
129 The Economic and Budgetary Effects of Producing Oil and Natural Gas From Shale (Congressional 
Budget Office, 12 September 2014) <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49815> 
130 Cooper, Jasmin, Laurence Stamford, and Adisa Azapagic, ‘Shale Gas: A Review of the Economic, 
Environmental, and Social Sustainability’, Energy Technology, 4 (2016), 772–92 
<https://doi.org/10.1002/ente.201500464> 
131 Michael E. Porter et al, ‘America’s Unconventional Energy Opportunity’ (Harvard Business School, 
The Boston Consulting Group, 2015) <http://www.hbs.edu/competitiveness/Documents/america-
unconventional-energy-opportunity.pdf> [accessed 12 May 2017] 
132 ‘In 2015, U.S. Coal Production, Consumption, and Employment Fell by More than 10% - Today in 
Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)’ 
<https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28732> [accessed 20 May 2017] 
133 ‘Natural Gas Has Displaced Coal in the Northeast’s Generation Mix over the Past 10 Years - Today in 
Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)’ 
<https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31172> [accessed 20 May 2017] 
54 
 
usage, but also by the fact that while the gas prices are only a little higher than the 
respective equivalent of coal, the end price of electricity generated at gas-driven plants 
is significantly lower.134 
A promising potential for export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) was also 
conditioned by shale revolution. Due to the recently established shale production, the 
historical gas trade vector was diametrically reversed. Ronald Reagan Administration 
set a goal to de-control the American gas market in 1985-1986, reflecting both the 
intention to mitigate the dependence on external oil exporters and the industry’s trend to 
reduce the oil consumption and switch to natural gas.135 Imports (mainly from Canada) 
rapidly bounced and kept growing exponentially from 750 million cubic feet per year in 
1986 to its peak of 4.6 billion cubic feet per year in 2007.  
An additional impulse to the trend occurred in the beginning of 2000s when 
expecting a continuous rise in natural gas consumption the U.S. authorities initiated the 
construction of LNG receiving terminals to import from overseas. As it has already 
been mentioned, natural gas remains primarily a local fuel due to its physical 
characteristics, however thanks to the development of gases liquefaction and 
regasification technologies the international transportation has become more feasible 
and economically reasonable. LNG technology comprises compression and refrigeration 
of natural gas to the temperature of -160°C; as a result, it becomes liquid and decreases 
in volume by approximately 600 times. There are obvious advantages of using gas in 
this form from the economic point of view - the gas becomes transportable by any 
available mean of transport capable of transporting cryogenic tanks, while the 
compression ratio allows even small companies to deliver significant amounts of 
resource to regasification terminals.136  
However, from 2007 onwards it became clear that the United States would not 
use the receiving capacities of the constructed terminals – on the contrary, LNG 
exporting capacity would be a new priority. Some of the existing terminals were 
redesigned for liquefaction and export (yet it costs as much as half of a new facility) and 
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new ones were approved by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for 
construction. In 2012 the approved LNG export capacity was 84 billion cubic meters 
per year (Bcm/y) while as of January 2017 FERC authorized roughly 175 Bcm/y of 
LNG to be exported.137,138  
An administrative obstacle standing in the way of the US LNG export is the 
system of trading regulation – before energy commodity can be exported to a non-free-
trade-agreement (FTA) country the Department of Energy must verify that is 
corresponds to the national public interest. Yet, while in 2014 DOE approved three 
applications for LNG export to non-FTA countries, in 2017 there are already nine 
applications approved and thirteen more are under review.139 The energy companies’ 
desire and the US authorities’ favorable attitude towards the export of LNG is justified 
by a number of reasons.  
First of all, regardless of the aforementioned liberalization of the European gas-
markets, the most significant price drop related to the decoupling of oil and gas prices 
occurred in the US due to the newly discovered resources delivered to the market in 
plentiful amounts. At Henry-Hub – the US national platform for spot gas trading – a 
price for a million British thermal units (universal natural gas trading measure - mmBtu) 
has been floating around $3 since 2009.140 At the same time the prices for mmBtu at the 
European and Asian hubs varies from 3 to 5 times as much as at Henry Hub, which in 
business terms means a margin of 200%-400% after deduction of processing and 
transportation costs. This incentivizes energy companies to target overseas markets. 
Secondly, the US authorities seek to reduce the Russian influence over the European 
allies through the European energy markets, where Gazprom still has a significant share 
of supplies – in certain countries up to 70%.  
European market players welcome this initiative not only because of the overall 
price reduction and because of enhanced market effectiveness, but also because of the 
                                                          
137 Moryadee, Seksun, Steven A. Gabriel, and Hakob G. Avetisyan, ‘Investigating the Potential Effects of 
U.S. LNG Exports on Global Natural Gas Markets’, Energy Strategy Reviews, Sustainable Energy 
System Changes, 2 (2014), 273–88 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2013.12.004> 
138  U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission - North American LNG Import/Export Terminals 
Approved as of January 2017 <https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng.asp> [accessed 17 May 
2017] 
139 ‘Summary of LNG Export Applications of the Lower 48 States | Department of Energy’ 
<https://energy.gov/fe/downloads/summary-lng-export-applications-lower-48-states> [accessed 17 May 
2017] 
140 ‘Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (Dollars per Million Btu)’ 
<https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdA.htm> [accessed 17 May 2017] 
56 
 
potentially bolstered energy security of the region, which is still endangered by the 
ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Because of the “gas disputes” between the parties 
the transit of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory was interrupted in 2006 and 2009, 
what caused supply shocks in Europe.141 In May 2017 another round of the energy 
dispute seems to have started – the Executive Service of the Ukrainian Justice Ministry 
sanctioned a seizure of the Gazprom’s assets, which includes the gas transited to the 
EU. 142 Altogether, shale revolution in the US has become a remedy for a long-lasting 
US’ energy dependence on external supplies, accelerated the displacement of 
unambiguously environmentally harmful coal from the US market, significantly 
contributed to the growth of the national economy and bolstered the liberalization of 
natural gas markets both in the United States and potentially – in Europe and Asia. Yet 
the negative repercussions of the shale revolution might negate its benefits, and it is still 
unclear if the shale industry would be viable within the framework of enhanced 
sustainability priorities of national energy security strategy. 
2.3 Economic impact of shale revolution. Domestic and international 
consequences  
Another important implication of shale revolution is the stimulation of further 
decoupling of oil and gas prices in the US. From the 1970s, natural gas prices were 
tightly linked to the oil prices and lived together through rises and falls with a slight 
time lag. At that time natural gas was considered as a strictly locally traded resource 
(due to its specific transportation and storing characteristics), hence there was no 
international market to regulate the global prices; for that reason gas prices were linked 
to oil. It satisfied both the oil-producers and the end-users. The former ones traded a 
new type of resource (which happened to be a by-product of their traditional 
production) according to the rules and prices of oil market that they had already been 
accustomed to; the latter ones got a fair choice between two types of fuel used mainly 
for heating and electricity generation.143  
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In the most long-term gas contracts, dominated the European and Asian markets 
and executed via the broad network of pipelines, a gas-pricing formula was used, which 
incorporated the local gas market size in comparison to oil, price reduction coefficient 
in relation to oil, oil-to-gas unit conversion coefficient, also fiscal and marketing factors 
varied in formulas from contract to contract. Such agreements usually allowed a 
periodical renegotiation of coefficients, factors and discounts in accordance with the 
market circumstances.144 However, when the newly produced shale gas flooded the 
markets of the United States the positions of long-term supply contracts were shattered. 
An affordable, accessible, domestically produced natural gas drove the prices down, 
gave a momentum to the market, which developed its own mechanisms and patterns. In 
such circumstances, a binding to the oil prices was no longer meaningful and the prices 
decoupled. Now this process is known as gas markets liberalization.145  
In this regard, reveals itself one of the major questions in relation to shale 
production in the US still remains the following – what was the impact of shale 
revolution on the world energy resources prices? There is no clear answer yet and every 
affirmative and ultimate supposition can be deemed argumentative. In order to attempt 
an estimation of such sort a dissection is necessary. Shale revolution could affect energy 
prices in four most vital dimensions – domestic gas prices; domestic oil prices; 
international gas prices; international oil prices.  
As far as domestic gas prices are concerned – increased shale gas production in 
the US since 2008 coupled with world economic crisis led to a drop in the domestic gas 
prices. While the world oil prices bounced back within a matter of one year after the 
crisis (as demonstrated by Figure 1), the US gas market liberalization, bolstered by 
shale production, not only postponed the return to the higher prices by more than a year, 
but it also predetermined the fact the US gas prices never returned to the pre-2009 level. 
Figure 2 demonstrates this chain of events – in 2008 the prices skyrocketed from the 
average of $6 to roughly $13 per million Btu. As the graph shows, after the prices fell 
dramatically (with the oil prices and the world economy), they remained below the $5 
level ever since. As Jiang-Bo Geng et al. point it out, the immense amounts of shale gas 
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on American market also wiped out the seasonal fluctuations in prices; it indicates the 
highest level of market liberalization.146 Even the peak in the world energy prices of 
2012-2014, which is usually attributed to Chinese economy’s rapid development and 
energy demand, was mitigated by shale gas production and liberalized markets; hence 
prices rose rather insignificantly in this period.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
146 Ibid. 
Figure 1.Average Annual OPEC Oil Price from 2008 to 2017. (In U.S. Dollars per Barrel)  
Source: The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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The impact of shale oil production on domestic prices was not significant. The 
US imports 3.1 million barrels per day (mbpd), 4.25 mbpd are produced at shale sites, 
4.65 mbpd are produced conventionally.147 On the one hand 4.25 mbpd is a 
considerable number; it is around 48% out of all American domestic oil production, this 
result was achieved in 8 years – since the process of active shale development 2008. M. 
Salameh from International Association for Energy Economics (as much as many other 
commentators) suggested in 2013 that such a rapid pace of shale oil extraction possesses 
a potential for crushing oil prices in the US by analogy with the gas market.148 The 
Figure 3 below shows the process of shale oil development in the US. It can be 
observed that after a preliminary preparation phase of 2008-2009, the most active and 
uninterrupted growth in shale oil production took place between 2010 and 2014. Figure 
4 demonstrates the West Texas Intermediate (WTI – the leading American oil sort) oil 
price fluctuations from January 1st 2008 to May 1st 2017. After comparing the data 
presented by Figures 3 and 4, it is to be admitted that a significant rise in shale oil 
production in the US coincided with the WTI price drop in 2014. 
 
                                                          
147 ‘How Much Oil Is Consumed in the United States? - FAQ - U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA)’ <https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=33&t=6> [accessed 22 June 2017] 
148 Salameh, Mamdouh G., Impact of US Shale Oil Revolution on the Global Oil Market, the Price of Oil 
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Figure 2. Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price. (In U.S. Dollars per Million Btu) 
Source: The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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Yet the correlation-regression analysis of the given data with 113 observations 
shows that there is a statistically insignificant negative correlation between these two 
variables. 
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Regression statistics 
Multiple R 0.413053553 
R-squared 0.170613238 
Normalized R-squared 0.163141285 
Standard deviation 22.38727948 
Observations 113 
Correlation statistics  
Correlation strength  -0.413053553 
 
 
Thus we can assume that suggestion about shale oil (or light tight oil) production would 
crush the American oil market in unviable. Oil is an internationally produced and traded 
commodity, price of which is affected by a range of factors – often arbitrarily and 
unpredictably. Such amount as ca. 4.5 mbpd being shortly tossed onto a market would 
make a significant difference in a (relatively) closed system, such a regional or local gas 
markets. The drop of the US gas prices and unfolding market liberalization is the most 
vocal example. However for a dynamic mutable multipartite interconnected system such 
as the world oil market, operating with almost 100 million barrels produced every day – 
4.5% influx is noticeable, yet not of the utmost importance of influence.149 Among other 
plausible reasons for oil price drop there are usually mentioned a reluctance of OPEC to 
reduce collective production, deceleration of the Chinese economy, international 
sanctions that were lifted from Iraq (2016), European shift towards green economy.150 
Following the same logic, one can be derive that the overall impact of the shale 
oil production in the US did not have a profound impact on the international oil 
markets. Even though the long-lasting US moratorium on oil exports was lifted in 2015, 
and by March 2017, the American crude oil export was 834 thousand barrels per day, it 
is incomparable with Saudi Arabia exporting around 7.5 million barrels per day.151 The 
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US producers were not eager to export the newly discovered shale oil for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, as it was mentioned – the reduction of energy imports and reaching full 
energy independence had been the priority of the US Administrations for decades. Now 
when the opportunity presented itself, it is to be expected that at least in the short-term 
the most of the shale oil reside in the country of origin.152  
Moreover, the European and Asian markets are already flooded with Middle 
Eastern and Russian oil; its low production price makes light tight oil from the US 
uncompetitive. Figure 5 shows that the production cost of one barrel of oil in Saudi 
Arabia is $6. The production cost of one barrel of shale oil in the US is $23. 
Consequently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can afford threefold dumping ratio for 
quite a long time without any damage to the national budget, in order to cut off the shale 
production.  
                                                          
152 Kennedy, Charles, ‘U.S. Lifted The Crude Oil Export Ban, And Exports Went…Down’, OilPrice.com 
<http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/US-Lifted-The-Crude-Oil-Export-Ban-And-Exports-
WentDown.html> [accessed 25 June 2017] 
Figure 5. Cost of producing a barrel of oil and gas (US Dollars) 
Source: Rystad Energy UCube 
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However, playing with the expectations of the major competitors, namely – 
OPEC, and forcing them to undertake necessary measures for securing their market 
share – is the only way shale industry can have any significant impact on the world oil 
prices. Immense amounts of extractable and affordable oil that suddenly (on the long-
term trade scale) materialized in the hand of world’s leading power could not have been 
perceived by the cartel as nothing less but a direct threat. In 2014, OPEC adopted an 
updated production strategy aimed at members’ extraction shares optimization, holding 
on to the market and displacing the shale producers beyond the breakeven point. 
Practically it manifested in cartel overproducing oil and driving the world prices down. 
To a certain extent, it can be considered as a knock-off effect of the shale revolution.153 
Nevertheless, according to the Rystad Energy’s 2017 report, since 2013 the breakeven 
point of major shale producing sites in the US reduced from $80 to $30 per barrel.154 As 
long as cheap and available domestically produced oil remains on the agenda of 
American Authorities, one can expect considerable investments into the development of 
technologies that would make this price even lower. Once the production price of shale 
oil hits the Russian mark of slightly below $19 per barrel, the shale industry is 
integrated into the world oil pricing mechanisms. On the one hand it reinforces the 
market positions of the US shale oil and makes it immune to dumping; but on the other 
hand, the latter loses the privilege of being an exogenous revolutionary intervening 
factor with unexplored potential and rapidly growing production. 
 Lastly, the impact of shale revolution on the international gas prices is not 
significant yet. It is a widespread belief that shale gas production caused traditional 
suppliers divert the routes from the US to Europe, which allegedly caused the drop in 
prices and market liberalization. 155,156 However, this assumption is not supported by 
facts. The usual suspect – Qatar – never exported more than 90 million cubic feet of gas 
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per year to the US, which is around 2.6% of the Unites States’ overall gas imports.157 
The major natural gas supplier of the US has always been Canada – 97% of the gas 
imports since 1973. It is proven that Canadian gas exports have been decreasing over 
the past years because of the shale production in the US - from 10.6 Billion cubic feet 
per day (Bcf/d) in 2007 to 7.4 Bcf/d in 2014.158 Nevertheless, there are two facts to be 
noted: firstly, the spare amounts dwelling in Canada drove the prices down and 
enhanced local consumption, which takes over the gas that used to be exported to the 
US. Secondly, Canada simply lacks LNG infrastructure and respective export capacities 
to tap into European markets.159  
European gas-market liberalization and price drop happened due to structural 
reforms caused by political necessity. By 2000s, the mechanism of long-term contracts 
with gas prices tied to oil faced a few complications and the European energy 
companies were the first ones to incur losses. European demand for natural gas was 
decreasing due to the overall economic recession (which created an oversupply and 
natural move towards price decrease), gradual shift to renewable sources of energy and 
cheaper alternatives such as spare coal from the US (another consequence of shale 
revolution and coal economy displacement). At the same time during the first decade of 
2000s the oil prices pierced the ceiling every year (excluding 2008 due to the world 
economic crisis), while the energy companies were bound to purchase contracted 
amounts of natural gas (primarily Russian) at a very unreasonable and non-market price.  
This situation gave start to the European gas-market reconstruction and 
reorientation to a diversified pool of competing suppliers. Spot trading was favored; it 
took place at the hubs such as TTF (Title Transfer Facility) in Netherlands or NBP 
(National Balancing Point) in the United Kingdom, where the gas prices were delinked 
from oil and commodities traded according to the market trends. European legislation 
was aligned accordingly and through so called “energy packages”, aimed at reduction of 
the external suppliers (such as Gazprom) ability to influence and dominate gas markets 
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and end-prices. 160 Figure 6 shows how the structure of the European gas export looks 
like now. It indicated that while sticking to two major suppliers of the natural gas, the 
EU has successfully secured a pool of suppliers that could be opted for in case of the 
import policy change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that shale revolution had a profound effect on the 
US gas market, bolstered its liberalization and decoupling from oil prices. At the same 
time, it is unlikely that the American oil market was structurally affected in terms of 
                                                          
160 Stern, Jonathan P., Continental European Long-Term Gas Contracts: Is a Transition Away from Oil 
Product-Linked Pricing Inevitable and Imminent? (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2009) 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/befa/6ac8700f9a65c8e6181666f928c04a915cb2.pdf> [accessed 12 May 
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Figure 6. Import of natural gas to the European Union in 2016 
Source: BP Statistical Review 2016 
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prices; yet the shale production allowed reaching a long pursued objective of the US 
Administrations – energy independence. As far as the international markets are 
concerned, although shale revolution bears a considerable potential for reforming the 
world energy system, at its current stage shale production’s impact on world oil and gas 
prices is rather moderate. International oil prices seem to remain unaffected directly by 
the shale oil production. However, certain counter-measures undertaken by the major 
market players such as OPEC, who aimed at shattering shale oil industries, interfered 
with the global prices and supposedly added a minor portion to the overall drop in oil 
prices after 2014. Finally yet importantly, the international gas prices remain 
uninfluenced by the proximate production of shale gas in the US because international 
gas markets still remain regional self-contained entities. LNG exports can change this 
trend but it is too soon to speak about it now, it is a long-term matter. Similar to the 
international oil prices, gas prices at certain markets can be somewhat altered by the 
expectations and apprehensions of the players – it can be argued that the EU managed to 
secure a better bargaining position against Gazprom, when referring to the shale gas that 
potentially can substitute Russian supplies. Thus, to an extent, shale gas contributed to 
the liberalization and reformation of the European gas market. Nevertheless, it is not 
only positive impact that shale revolution bore.  
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Chapter 3 – Discussion: Shale Revolution in the light of the sustainability 
principles 
  
Extraction of natural resources has never been harmless for the environment. An 
access to previously inaccessible resources comes at even a higher price than usual. As 
it has already been mentioned, the hydraulic fracturing – the primary method of shale 
resources extraction – has a profound negative impact on the environment. There are 
several main ways the damage can be inflicted: through air emissions; water 
overconsumption and contamination; land contamination and desolation; and induced 
seismic activity.  
 
Air pollution 
 It is widely known that the amount of carbon dioxide produced after burning 
natural gas is significantly lower than by other resources – almost twice as little as 
coal.161 Nevertheless, there are ways natural gas can harm the environment, one of them 
is methane leakages. Methane (CH4) constitutes one-tenth of the all US’ air emissions. 
Lifetime cycle of methane in the atmosphere is significantly shorter than CO2, but CH4 
stores considerably more radiation, which contributes to the atmospheric pollution and 
stultifies the benefits of coal substitution.162 There several stages within the process of 
shale gas extraction, when the methane leakages can take place. Firstly, it is the well-
completion stage – when the fluids pumped into the shaft are flowing back. The usual 
share of methane being released into the atmosphere is between 0.6% and 3.2% of a 
well’s entire capacity, which is significantly higher than the one of a conventional gas 
extraction site – 0.01%.163 Secondly, it is the ventilation and equipment leaks. Every 
shale shaft has multiple connections to the exploration and extraction equipment of the 
surface, and methane keeps leaking even after the completion of the well. This stage is 
accounted for leakages of 0.3% to 1.9% of the total production; only the high-end not-
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omnipresent technology can ensure the lower outcome of 0.3%.164 Thirdly, it is the 
processing phase when the gas not eligible for being transported via pipeline 
downstream must be purified of contaminants. The average leakage at this stage is 
around 0.19% of the total production.165 Finally, it is the leakages occurring by 
transportation, storing and distribution. Truck road crashes, failures of the pipeline 
infrastructure, mishandling in the storing facilities and at the end-user side account for 
the average of 2.5% leakages out of the total production.166 In a word, the overall 
methane leakages from a shale gas extraction site can vary from 3.59% to 7.79%. Given 
that the companies have never reported many emergencies and failures during 
extraction, processing, transportation and distribution – hence, they not documented by 
the researchers – the actual number is likely to be higher. 
In order to estimate the level of harm inflicted onto the environment by the 
methane leakages and define the nature of contradiction to sustainable energy security, 
it is necessary to assess comparatively two time scales – that of a 20 years period and of 
100 years. Peer-review literature suggests that in the long run – a century - the impact of 
methane is lower due to its shorter time of presence in the atmosphere. However, on the 
100 years scale the footprint of shale industry’s methane leakages is similar to one 
attributed to coal – from 18% lower to 15% higher, depending on the performance of 
the shale developing companies. On the 20 years scale this number is even higher – 
from 20% to 100% higher GHG impact, when the energy output of the fuel burned is 
quantitatively compared.167 As far as the practical implication are concerned, it has been 
calculated that a relatively safe emissions threshold for shale industry is around 2% of 
methane leakages out of the total production; if this number is exceeded the global 
warming rate will accelerate. At the level of 5-10% of leakages, the global temperature 
might rise by 0.1-0.2 degrees Celsius over the course of 50 years. This will be solely the 
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contribution of methane released into the atmosphere, which is accounted for only 10% 
of the overall GHG emissions of anthropogenic nature.168 
 
 Water consumption and contamination 
 Water is used at the development of underground deposits when the shaft is 
being drilled, the casing is being put in place and cemented, when the hydraulic fracture 
itself is being performed and lastly when the deposits are being extracted. Significant 
concerns arose in the US society about the enormous amounts of fresh water being used 
for the hydraulic fracturing, i.e. possibly drawn from agriculture and civilian 
consumption. Shortly after that, a torrid debate unfolded in the academic circles. The 
first major point of discussion is the intensity of water consumption attributed to shale 
resources production. In 2014, Scanlon et al. published an argumentative study stating 
that in fact unconventional oil production (UOP) – such as shale oil – requires less fresh 
water than conventional oil production (COP). The study also asserted that alarming rise 
of water volumes consumed by UOP is nothing but the result of the overall growth of 
the sector.169 Yet, shortly after – in 2015 – a comment by David J. Lampert was 
published who was questioning the results of the given study. The main claim of 
Lampert’s was that while comparing water consumption of COP and UOP Scanlon et 
at. considered all three stages of COP (drilling, fracturing, injection/recovery) and only 
the primary stage of UOP (drilling, fracturing).170 Employing the calculations on water 
consumption in the oil industries conducted by Wu et al. Lampert sought to disprove the 
assumption that UOP required less fresh water that COP.171 
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Scanlon et al. in its turn published a response to Lampert’s comment, stating that 
the procedures of the secondary and tertiary stages of COP proved their limited 
effectiveness by UOP thus would hardly be employed by the industry.172 This 
discussion sheds a light on the state of disagreement within the academic circles on the 
subject. Figure 7 demonstrates the estimates rates of water consumption at different 
stages of both shale and conventional oil extraction. It clearly shows that the initial 
stages of extraction, such as drilling and fracturing, require far less water than later 
stages. The discrepancy between the amounts of water used for various phases vividly 
demonstrates how by varying the number of stages being considered, the manipulation 
with the demonstrable outcome becomes possible.  
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Figure 7. Comparison of water injection and consumption for different 
technologies throughout the lifecycle of petroleum reservoirs. 
Source: Lampert, David J. “Comment on ‘Comparison of Water Use for 
Hydraulic Fracturing for Unconventional Oil and Gas versus Conventional 
Oil.’” Environmental Science & Technology 49, no. 10 
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Even regardless of the comparative consumption characteristics of UOP and 
COP, the US’ shale gas and shale oil production consumes annually 116 and 66 billion 
liters of fresh water respectively. It is also noteworthy that shale gas extraction requires 
3 times more water than that of shale oil production. It accounts to 0.87% of the overall 
industrial water use in the US and 0.04 of the national fresh water reserves.173 In 
addition, it is stated by Ceres (American sustainability NGO) that although the amount 
of fresh water being drawn by shale production is relatively moderate, it hit the regions 
that had already been stressed in terms of water provision due to logistical and climatic 
reasons. 174 It contradicts to the very basic principles of sustainable development 
outlined in Chapter 2. 
Even more severe impact on the environment and in particular – local lands and 
water basins – has a flowback liquid. Flowback water (or produced water) – is the one 
being injected to a shaft, which then partially resurfaces, enriched with the various 
dissolved solids. Apart from the extraction-fostering chemicals it contains in the first 
place, after soaking into the petroliferous and gas-bearing soils such water also absorbs 
all sorts of contaminants. Among those usually are such elements as Se, V, Sr, B, Mn, 
Ni, Cd, Cu, Zn, Ba, Pb, Ra, NH4, many of which are toxic and carcinogenic. Yet, the 
most common combination of contaminants is Na-Ca-Cl.175 While the regular 
acceptable amount of total dissolved solids (TDS) in freshwater should not be more than 
1000 mg per liter, flowback water from Bakken site contains, according to reports, from 
35000 to more than 600000 mg of TDS per liter. It is asserted by Shrestha et al. that the 
Bakken shale site in North Dakota (ND) is ideal for the evaluation of the environmental 
impact of shale production because in most of the other shale production regions people 
have been extracting conventional resources for more than a century now. Bakken site 
                                                          
173 Kondash, Andrew, and Avner Vengosh. “Water Footprint of Hydraulic Fracturing.” Environmental 
Science & Technology Letters 2, no. 10 (October 13, 2015): 276–80. doi:10.1021/acs.estlett.5b00211. 
174 Freyman, Monika, and Salmon Ryan. “Hydraulic Fracturing & Water Stress: Growing Competitive 
Pressures for Water.” Boston, MA, USA, May 2013. https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/hydraulic-
fracturing-water-stress-growing-competitive-pressures-water. 
175 Zolfaghari, Ashkan, Hassan Dehghanpour, Mike Noel, and Doug Bearinger. “Laboratory and Field 
Analysis of Flowback Water from Gas Shales.” Journal of Unconventional Oil and Gas Resources 14 
(June 1, 2016): 113–27. doi:10.1016/j.juogr.2016.03.004. 
72 
 
was subjected to such developments only in 2007, which allows seeing a clearer cut of 
shale industry’s impact.176  
Flowback water poses the most danger when being spilled from the 
infrastructure – either during the transportation to a toxic dumpsite or proximately at the 
extraction site because of breakdown. By example of Bakken site, it was evaluated that 
such brine spills can contaminate local waters for a period up to 4 years.177 As far as 
land contaminations is concerned, it contains the toxins even longer, which severely 
undermines agriculture. For example, in 2014 in county Williams in ND, a spill of 24 
thousand liters of produced water occurred as a result of vehicle accident; almost a 
square kilometer of fertile land was contaminated.178 Given that in 2014 the reported 
brine spills reached more than 11 million liters only in ND, one can calculate that the 
area of land that could potentially have been contaminated is around 450 square 
kilometers, which almost equals the area of Chicago.179 One also must bear in mind that 
not all the spills are being documented and that flawback water manifests itself through 
penetrating underground waters directly from shale shafts.  
Flowback chemicals that contaminate local waters and lands can cause various 
diseases and health complications. Among those: skin, sensory organs, respiratory and 
gastrointestinal systems damage; nervous, immune, cardiovascular, endocrine and renal 
systems inhibition; cancer and mutations.180 In 2012 McKenzie et al. published a study 
reporting that people residing within 800m radius from shale gas production sites are at 
a greater risk of cancer.181 According to the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) from 2000 to 2013, around 9.4 million people lived within 1.5 kilometers from a 
                                                          
176 Shrestha, Namita, Govinda Chilkoor, Joseph Wilder, Venkataramana Gadhamshetty, and James J. 
Stone. “Potential Water Resource Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing from Unconventional Oil Production 
in the Bakken Shale.” Water Research 108 (January 2017): 1–24. doi:10.1016/j.watres.2016.11.006. 
177 Lauer, Nancy E., Jennifer S. Harkness, and Avner Vengosh. “Brine Spills Associated with 
Unconventional Oil Development in North Dakota.” Environmental Science & Technology 50, no. 10 
(May 17, 2016): 5389–97. doi:10.1021/acs.est.5b06349. 
178 “General Environmental Incident Summary.” North Dakota Department of Health, May 3, 2014. 
http://www.ndhealth.gov/EHS/FOIA/Spills/Summary_Reports/EIR3228_Summary_Report.pdf. 
179 Bradley G. StevensBradley G. Stevens. “Spills. Clean-Up. Primer.” The Energy & Environmental 
Research Center (EERC), 2015. https://energyofnorthdakota.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/BPOP-
Spils-Clean-up-Primer-2015-1.pdf. 
180 Colborn, Theo, Carol Kwiatkowski, Kim Schultz, and Mary Bachran. “Natural Gas Operations from a 
Public Health Perspective.” Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal 17, no. 5 
(September 1, 2011): 1039–56. doi:10.1080/10807039.2011.605662. 
181 McKenzie, Lisa M., Roxana Z. Witter, Lee S. Newman, and John L. Adgate. “Human Health Risk 
Assessment of Air Emissions from Development of Unconventional Natural Gas Resources.” Science of 
The Total Environment 424 (May 1, 2012): 79–87. doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2012.02.018. 
73 
 
production site, where hydraulic fracture was employed. EPA also estimated the number 
of public drinking sources with the same range to be 6800.182 In other words, such 
implications of shale production undermine the sustainable development of the US 
through directly endangering American citizens’ welfare.  
It can be argued that the amount of spilled produced water is insignificant in 
comparison to the total amount of flowback liquids. In 2014 in ND, brine spills 
constituted only 0.016% of the overall flowback volumes.183 Yet, the management of 
collected produced water is another issue for shale industry and American sustainability 
paradigm. Shrestha et al. outline 5 options for flowback water management: 
1) Preventing produced from surfacing at all with the help of particular polymer 
gels separating water from gas and oil at the output.  
2) Reinjection of collected produced water to the emptied shale reservoirs. This 
implies the potential threat of underground freshwater flows contamination. 
Next three options are the most favorable because they imply treatment and 
purification of produced water. 
3) Disposal of the filtered and treated produced water at the governmentally 
assigned deep storage reservoirs. 
4) Reusing of filtered and treated produced water at the hydraulic fracturing 
sites. 
5) Using of filtered and treated produced water for irrigation and cattle 
consumption.184 
 
Options 2-5 imply produced water transportation or\and treatments costs and this 
poses another question about how financially sustainable this energy venture. The 
school of ‘strong’ sustainability does not approve of monetizing the environmental 
damages and plainly converting the issues of sustainability to financial costs. 
Nevertheless, in order to comply with the one of the ground principles of SD, namely - 
merging environmental and economic concerns in decision-making – sometimes it is 
necessary. 
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 Reverse osmosis (RO) as a treatment system for produced shale water has 
proven to be an optimal purification tool because of the 70% water recovery rate and 
moderate prices. The industrial producers offer heavy off-site RO systems for the price 
of around $0.3 per barrel of treated water.185 Given the amount of brine spills in ND in 
2014, namely – 432 million barrel – it can be easily calculated that the cost of treatment 
would be $129.6 million. 
 It is also worth calculating the costs of freshwater as such consumed by ND 
shale production as much as the costs of its transportation. According to Stepan et al. 
the price of fresh water in ND varies from $0.25 to $1.75 per barrel.186 Given that the 
amount of water consumed in ND in 2012 was 4.3 billion gallons or 136.5 million 
barrel, and employing the arithmetic mean of the prices variations, this water cost to the 
industry somewhat $136.5 million (by 2014 this number only increased). Transportation 
of freshwater costs between $0.63 and $5 per barrel, which would result in $365.8 
million. In addition, the transportation of produced water to the deep reservoirs of 
treatment facilities due to different chemical characteristics costs more – from $0.63 to 
$9. While the amount of produced water in ND in 2014 was 432 million barrels, the 
cost of its transportation reaches $2.08 billion.187 
Taking into consideration the gas and oil prices in the beginning of 2015, market 
worth of shale resources extracted in 2014 in ND was roughly $17 billion.188,189,190,191 
This makes the cost of water acquisition, treatment and transportation constitutes 
around $2.7 billion. This is approximately 15.8% of the total market worth of shale gas 
and oil produced, which being almost one-sixth of the total revenues is rather 
significant. Bearing in mind the long-term consequences such as undermining 
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population’s welfare, lands desolation and water reservoirs contamination, both 
economic and environmental sustainability of shale production is questionable.  
 
Energy security and sustainability indices 
In the light of the aforementioned facts, it becomes clear that shale revolution 
complexly affected multiple sides of America’s energy industry, societal welfare, 
environmental stability and national security. A proper tool for comparatively analyzing 
the repercussions for these sectors would be the energy assessment indices presented by 
various international organizations and institutes. First index to look at should be the 
Index of the U.S. Energy Security Risk. Combining various data throughout the years, it 
estimates the state of the U.S. energy industry’s exposure to exogenous and endogenous 
threats. Its evaluations of the U.S. overall energy risks as much as the oil and gas import 
exposures are very demonstrative. Figures 8,9 and 10 clearly demonstrate that since 
2011, the risks in this regard fell dramatically – to the level of pre-1973-shock period. 
This can undoubtedly be attributed to the effects of Shale revolution.192 
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Figure 8. Energy Security Risk Index. Global Energy Institute. 
Source: Global Energy Institute. U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
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 The next index to be reviewed is Environmental Performance Index created by 
Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and Columbia University (Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network) in collaboration with the World 
Figure 9. U.S. Energy Security Risk Index. Natural gas imports exposure. 
Source: Global Energy Institute. U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Figure 10. U.S. Energy Security Risk Index. Oil imports exposure. 
Source: Global Energy Institute. U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
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Economic Forum and the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. Center 
calculates the performance indicators of health impacts, air quality, water and sanitation, 
water resources, agriculture, forests, fisheries, biodiversity and habitat, and climate and 
energy. According to Figure 11, combination of results of these calculations 
demonstrate that U.S. in the world vanguard of environmental development alone with 
such countries as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and most of the Western Europe. 
This is the product of synergy of American environmental standards, environment 
protection agencies, rather strict legislature and civil society’s engagement in national 
politics.193 
 
 
 
However, when energy-related sustainability indices are being reviewed, certain 
changes in the outcome occur. Sustainable Society Foundation in Netherlands estimates 
countries’ sustainability aspect in the main spheres of activity. As far as such indicators 
                                                          
193 “Environmental Performance Index, 2016.” Environmental Index. NY:NASA: Socioeconomic Data 
and Applications Center (SEDAC), 2016. http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/epi-environmental-
performance-index-2016/maps?facets=theme:sustainability. 
Figure 11. Environmental Performance Index, 2016. 
Source: Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP) 
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as human well-being, biodiversity, healthy life, renewable water resources – the U.S. 
get 7-8 index points out of 10. Nevertheless, for such indicators as sustainability of 
environmental well-being, energy savings, greenhouse gases, renewable energy and 
energy use – United States get only 1-2 points out of 10. On the one hand, since 2006 
the category comprising these indicators – energy and climate – has shown some 
growth. However, if one dissects the outcome and analyses raw data used for the index 
it becomes clear that it is the energy savings indicators causing the progress within the 
category.194 This trend is in accordance with the energy saving potential of shale 
revolution. Not least because of coal substitution with gas – due to reduced household 
energy-bills the amount of the total energy saved can reach 30%.195,196 At the same time 
the rest of the indicators are either stagnating (environmental well-being, greenhouse 
gases, energy use) or declining (renewable water resources). The latter also can be 
explained by the shale industries added consumption of water and related contamination 
of water reservoirs.  
Lastly, one of the most famous and reliable indicators in this sphere – World 
Energy Council’s (WEC) “Energy Trilemma Balance” proves the previous assumption. 
According to it, over the period of 2011-2015 United States significantly improved their 
national energy security ranking – from 19th to 12th place (out of 125), while the 
environmental sustainability indicator yielded only the 90th score in 2011 and even 
worsened to 95th by 2015.197  
Figure 12 visualizes this index and clearly demonstrates that the US is heavily 
prone towards the Energy Security and Energy Equity developments, thus drawing the 
resources from the environmental protection. 
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Figure 12. U.S. Energy Trilemma Index. WEC. 2015 
Source: World Energy Council (WEC) 
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Conclusion 
 
Summing up, one should firmly assert that the very concept of energy security is 
not carved in stone, quite the opposite – it is an ongoing process including evolving 
methodological complexes and empirical tools. Having emerged out of the international 
efforts to counteract the immediate and distant repercussions of the energy crises of the 
1970s, it has a concrete value ground that spells an uninterrupted access to energy 
resources. Over the years the concept has gained multiple additional dimensions, many 
its fringes became clearer and more pronounced – such as the fundamental principles of 
ES. Other components keep developing and only yet to fully be integrated with the 
framework – such as the sustainability paradigm. In other words, energy security 
concept is a young rapidly evolving methodological and operational concept that allows 
addressing various problems of states and societies.  
As far as the notion of sustainable development is concerned, is has a lot in 
common with energy security – flexibility, recent origins, and versatility of application 
options. However, its structural bonds and framework are less pronounced than those of 
ES. On the one hand, the impermanence of the concept provides a potential for bringing 
even the parties with the opposing viewpoints to some common ground. Yet, for the 
same reason a disagreement can be ignited by the uncertainty of SD’s ways and 
assessment criteria. As a result, sustainable development notion should be resorted to 
with due preparation and understanding of the contextual framework where SD is to 
operate and to be implemented. It has proven to be fair in regard of the US energy 
security system and Shale revolution. It can add a humanitarian dimension to the latter 
ones and contribute to the overall positive refinement. Nevertheless, if defined and 
applied incorrectly this will yield no positive outcome – the drawbacks of Shale 
revolution might be overlooked.  
Still, the concept of SD bears a significant beneficial potential, which is affirmed 
by the worldwide recognition and acknowledgement by the most eminent researchers, 
major states, international companies and supranational organizations. It was introduced 
in 1981 and promptly adopted by the various segments of world’s societies, which gave 
start to an array of different schools, approaches, phasing and assessment criteria.  
Due to the widespread nature of the concept and its potential applicability for 
numerous social issues, there are multiple opinions on this matter. Naturally, camps of 
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supporters and opponents emerged – both on the international arena, represented by a 
number of countries – and within the states – being advocated and rebuked by political 
parties, public companies and independent specialists. Documenting and analyzing the 
achievements and failures of SD marked by the confrontation of various standpoints and 
schools has proved to be a viable method of assessing the contextual relevance and 
prospects of the notion within the US energy security paradigm. The peculiarity of the 
American case is that apart from the state’s authorities and proximate society there is 
another distinctive shareholder – major energy companies. Unlike in many other world 
leading energy states in the US they have little to no dependence on or subordinate 
affiliation with the governing structures. Hence it is those companies who will heavily 
influence the trajectory of SD’s development in the country. By the present moment the 
American corporations have gone through several stages of sustainability principles 
adoption – from mere negligence in 1980s to deeming it essential and integral part of 
the corporate strategy. Yet, there is no denying that self-serving concerns still prevail in 
the sphere over the sustainability agenda; a coordinated and systemic public pressure 
has always been and keeps being the major driver of the corporate – hence state’s – 
energy sustainability. 
Apart from that, the public discussion on the US energy policy itself has always 
been a torrid one. On the one hand, since the very oil shock of 1973 the necessity of 
providing the country with an uninterrupted access to energy resources became “first-
tier” priority; its fulfillment was to be ensured by practically any means. This notion 
was heavily supported by the highly influential military lobby in the US Congress – 
energy independence was deemed as a future cornerstone of national security. At the 
same time – and to an extent as the opposition to such ‘at any cost’ methods – 
environmental lobby advocated abstaining from conventional non-renewable resources 
exploitation. Given these – often mutually excluding positions, the Shale revolution was 
not only a logical, expected and almost inevitable outcome, but also has been seen by 
many as a factor of unification of confronting parties.  
Shale revolution was a thoroughly prepared breakthrough in methods and 
technologies of exploring previously inaccessible natural resources such as oil and gas. 
As a result, the US managed to get to the energy independence as near as possible and 
significantly bolster the national energy security. Not only it restructured and upgraded 
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the entire US energy system, but the repercussions of these events stretched out to the 
world markets and caused different consequences – both subjectively positive such as 
liberalization of the EU energy markets and subjectively negative such as partial 
devaluation of Russian gas in Europe, hence undermining Kremlin’s bargaining 
positions 
 
However, despite the fact that shale revolution conditioned the decoupling of oil 
and gas prices in the US, the effect on the oil prices as such was rather moderate. 
Nevertheless, there is evidential causality between Shale revolution and decrease in gas 
prices in the US; consequently it bears a potential for further liberalization of the world 
gas markets shifting the power balance on them in the long run.  
The impact of Shale revolution was significant enough for the major world 
energy players such as OPEC to act accordingly – a set of counter-measures (mostly 
price dumping) aimed at hindering the unfolding shale production was sanctioned with 
a relative success. Somehow or other the definite and comprehensive results of such 
measures and the Shale revolution itself are only yet to be revealed and analyzed – it is 
a matter of years and decades to come. Nevertheless, if the extraction and exploitation 
of previously inaccessible resources goes on in the current manner, a clear contradiction 
to the principles of sustainable energy development and proximate threats to the US 
national security and sustainability can be identified and outlined already now. 
 
Shale revolution remains viable and its results are expected to be more positive 
than otherwise only within the given framework of the US national energy security 
paradigm. In its current form it prioritizes the energy independence, energy sources 
diversifications, and uninterrupted access to energy. Yet, once the sustainable 
dimension is an integral part of the US energy security paradigm – i.a. the notion of 
merging environmental and economic concerns in decision making, Shale revolution 
can be deemed as undermining American national energy security. Thus, it can be 
asserted that the initial thesis is being proven: “Once the energy sustainability 
dimension is implemented into the NESE, the shale revolution in its current state is no 
longer viable”. 
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The first indicator that would raise serious concerns about Shale industries’ 
performance should the SD and ES be merged – is the methane leakage. It is estimated 
that shale gas extraction sites allow to leak from 3.59% to 7.79% of all discovered gas. 
It is also to be noted that these estimations are derived from officially documented 
infrastructure failures and companies’ reports. There is evidence that many occasions 
that led to methane leakages from shale cycle have never been documented; hence the 
end leakage percentage might occur to be higher. 
Relevant researches indicate that a methane leakages percentage, which could be 
conditionally neglected without undermining the sustainable development process – is 
no more than 2%. At the same time the leakages of 5% to 10% alone will result in 
contributing to the global temperature rise by 0.1-0.2 degrees Celsius within the period 
of 50 years (not including other GHG effects). This is the first direct contradiction to 
sustainability principles.  
 
Secondly, according to the official US statistics, shale industries utilize 182 
billion liters of fresh water every year, while shale gas production cycle – the vanguard 
of the industry – requires 3 times more than oil segment. On the one hand, it accounts to 
0.87% of the of the overall industrial water use in the US and 0.04 of the national fresh 
water reserves, which is rather moderate. On the other hand, the patterns of water 
redistribution indicate that shale industries draw fresh water resources from the areas 
that already experience complications with timely water provision due to climatic and 
logistical reasons. That alone is in violation with sustainable energy security principles 
of ‘meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water, and sanitation’ and 
‘conserving and enhancing the resource base’.  
Moreover, the water processed in the shale resources extraction cycles is 
inevitably contaminated with the chemical elements contained in ‘drill-enhancing’ 
liquids added by the engineers and in shale structures or surrounding soils themselves. 
Summing up, one can assert that there is an underlying problem with the 
perception of energy security and energy sustainability in the United States. Shale 
revolution unleashed a significant potential for bolstering the America’s national energy 
security via reducing or even eliminating reliance on the external suppliers of energy 
resources. It allowed USA to conduct more independent and bald international policies, 
84 
 
as much as boost national economy. Yet, the price of these achievements is 
controversial. Apart from direct costs connected to expenditures on shale production 
procedures and their immediate negative consequences management, there multiple 
unobvious long-term repercussions. They are problematic to calculate or evaluate 
unambiguously, but they have the utmost importance. Among them: lands desolation 
and water reservoirs contamination, wildlife extermination, endangering local 
populations’ welfare, deprivation of certain regions of fresh water and others. 
Moreover, there is an evident discrepancy in how these issues are being 
presented to the publicity. Energy, sustainability and environment related statistics and 
indices tend to demonstrate a truncated picture. Some exclusively highlight the growth 
of the national energy security and independence with no remarks on its downside. 
Others assert that overall America’s environmental development and sustainability of 
energy are in a very good condition. Yet they fail to mention that particular elements of 
these systems are far from being sustainable and certain factors such as shale production 
have greater and more dubious effects on energy sustainability, social welfare and 
environmental conditions. 
The research did not seek to review or reassert the negative impact of the Shale 
revolution tools and methods on the environment or vice versa – to whitewash it and 
underline its benefits. The respective pros and cons were weighted, but as circumstantial 
indicators. The aim set was to check – how does this (now truly integral) part of the US 
energy industry complement or contradict to the sustainability paradigm the US will 
inevitable have to adopt. It can be concluded that if in the foreseeable future the US 
authorities will decisively opt for pivoting towards a really sustainable path of energy 
development, they will encounter a compelling need to revise and alter the most 
controversial effects of shale industry such as air, water and soil pollution, 
environmental and social welfare compromising and freshwater exploitation. Should the 
sustainable energy development and environmental stewardship dimension be 
implemented into the US National Security paradigm, the Shale Revolution’s 
achievements as we know them would cease to be viable.  
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